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INTRODUCTION
Copyright and utility patent laws have historically regulated different
types of intellectual creations.1 Copyright protection has been available for
original works of authorship,2 and utility patent protection for inventive technologies.3 Overlaps in these two types of intellectual property (IP) rights
have largely been avoided through the very different statutory subject matters
of each law’s protection,4 as well as through channeling doctrines that courts
have developed to manage the boundaries when statutory subject matter differences alone have not sufficed.5
1 The U.S. Constitution offers a key distinction between copyright and utility patent
subject matters in giving Congress the power to grant exclusive rights for limited times to
authors and inventors in “their respective [w]ritings and [d]iscoveries” as a means to promote the progress of science and the useful arts. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). The first copyright statute was enacted in 1790. See Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790) (repealed 1831) (“An Act for the encouragement of learning.”).
3 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). The first patent statute was enacted in 1790. See Patent Act
of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790) (repealed 1793) (“An Act to promote the progress of
useful Arts.”).
4 The subject matters of the Patent Act of 1790 were “any useful art, manufacture,
engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein not before known or used.” Patent Act of 1790, § 1. Patent subject matter today is virtually identical to that in the 1790
Act, although over time the term “process” was substituted for “useful art,” “compositions
of matter” were added to the subject matter provision, and “engine” and “device” dropped
out. 35 U.S.C. § 101. The subject matter of the Copyright Act of 1790—maps, charts, and
books—was much narrower than the subject matter of copyright under current law. Cf. 17
U.S.C. § 102(a); Copyright Act of 1790, § 1; see Pamela Samuelson, Evolving Conceptions of
Copyright Subject Matter, 78 U. PITT. L. REV. 17 (2016) (discussing the history of expansions
in copyright subject matters). For a general discussion of the boundaries of IP regimes, see
for example Christopher Buccafusco & Mark A. Lemley, Screening Functionality (Stanford
Pub. Law Working Paper No. 2888094, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2888094; Mark P. McKenna & Christopher Jon Sprigman, What’s in, and
What’s Out: How IP Boundary Rules Shape Innovation (Feb. 19, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2735073.
5 Patent law, for instance, excludes copyright subject matters from its domain largely
through its “printed matter” and “mental process” doctrines. See, e.g., Kevin Emerson Collins, Semiotics 101: Taking the Printed Matter Doctrine Seriously, 85 IND. L.J. 1379, 1402 n.134,
1404 n.148 (2010); see also Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342,
1349–56 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (invalidating the patent for an electronic kiosk authoring system
because its reference to the system’s conformance with good standards of aesthetics rendered the claims indefinite). The main copyright doctrines that channel patent subject
matters out of copyright’s domain are the “useful article” limitation on “pictorial, graphic,
and sculptural works,” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (providing definitions of “pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works” and “useful article”), and the exclusions of processes, systems, and methods of operation depicted or otherwise embodied in copyrighted works, id. § 102(b). See,
e.g., Smith & Hawken, Ltd. v. Gardendance, Inc., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d 1853, 1855 (N.D. Cal.
2005) (“The useful article doctrine serves the important policy of keeping patent and copy-
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The copyright and utility patent regimes differ not only in their subject
matters, but also in the starkly distinctive mechanisms by which protection
arises and the duration for which protections last.6 The relative ease of
acquiring copyright, its long duration, and broad scope, as compared with a
utility patent, may tempt creators to claim copyright protection in creations
that are utility patent subject matter.7
Notwithstanding this temptation, it has been relatively rare for creators
to assert both copyright and utility patent protections in the same intellectual
creations. Yet it has happened on occasion.8 One such claim arose in Baker
v. Selden, whose plaintiff contended that copyright protected the novel bookkeeping system disclosed in the author’s book, a system for which Selden had
sought, but apparently had not obtained, a utility patent.9 In Baker, the
Supreme Court rejected Selden’s claim and seemingly endorsed a categorical
exclusivity approach under which intellectual creations should be understood to be eligible for either copyright or utility patent protection, but not
for both.10
The principal authority that has regarded overlapping copyright and
utility patent protections to be unproblematic has been the Nimmer copyright treatise.11 The treatise’s treatment of the copyright/utility patent overlap issue is, however, deeply flawed. Those flaws notwithstanding, the
Supreme Court has been skeptical of categorical exclusivity arguments in
some IP cases. This skepticism suggests the need for more nuanced strategies when attempting to discern the proper boundaries of copyright and utility patent protections than the one-or-the-other-but-not-both approach
endorsed in Baker or the overlaps-are-fine approach endorsed in the Nimmer
treatise.
When presented with copyright claims as to seemingly ambiguous subject matters, such as toys, puzzles, and computer programs, courts and the
Copyright Office have developed several different responses. The most common has been a layering or segmentation approach under which courts treat
right separate by preventing parties from using copyright to obtain a ‘backdoor patent’ on
a functional article that cannot be patented.” (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(b))). The useful
article limitation on copyright subject matter is discussed infra Section II.C. See also Bruce
E. Boyden, Games and Other Uncopyrightable Systems, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 439, 447 (2011)
(characterizing § 102(b) as intended to channel processes and systems in copyrighted
works to the patent system); Viva R. Moffat, The Copyright/Patent Boundary, 48 U. RICH. L.
REV. 611, 617–33 (2014) (discussing the useful article doctrine as a channeling doctrine).
Another copyright channeling doctrine can be found in 17 U.S.C. § 113(b) (copyright
does not extend to designs of useful articles depicted in copyrighted works).
6 These differences are discussed at some length infra text accompanying notes
13–35.
7 Exemplary cases are discussed infra Section I.A.
8 Parts I and II give several examples of intellectual creations whose authors/inventors have claimed both copyright and patent protections for their creations.
9 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 99–102 (1879).
10 Id. at 104, 107.
11 See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2A.07 (2016).
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some aspects of an intellectual creation as protectable by copyright law (e.g.,
an original drawing of a parachute), while other aspects may be protectable,
if at all, by utility patents (e.g., a design of a parachute).12 But five other
strategies for determining copyright and utility patent boundaries are evident
in the literature, each of which has sought to preserve separate and distinct
domains for copyright and utility patent protections.
I. COPYRIGHT

UTILITY PATENT BOUNDARIES: MUTUALLY
EXCLUSIVE OR OVERLAPPING?

AND

There are both constitutional and statutory reasons why courts for well
over a century have maintained sharp distinctions between the copyright and
utility patent domains.13 The U.S. Constitution plainly distinguishes the
“[w]ritings” of “[a]uthors,” which it gives Congress the power to protect
through copyright laws, and “[i]nvent[ions]” in the “useful [a]rts,” which
Congress can protect by enacting patent laws.14 That the framers of the Constitution conceived of copyright and patent as having separate domains is
evidenced by the document’s reference to the “respective [w]ritings and
[d]iscoveries” of authors and inventors.15 The framers also envisioned that
the two laws would serve different purposes: copyright’s grant of exclusive
rights in the writings of authors was intended to promote progress in science
12 See, e.g., Fulmer v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 1021, 1022 (Ct. Cl. 1952).
13 The bulk of authority not only in the United States, but also in Europe and Canada,
supports exclusivity of copyright and utility patent law domains. See, e.g., ESTELLE DERCLAYE
& MATTHIAS LEISTNER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OVERLAPS: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 90–91,
95 (2011) (European commentary noting that overlap between copyright and utility patent
“should not normally exist because of the general, universal rule excluding technical subject matter from copyright law” because it is patentable); ROBERT TOMKOWICZ, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OVERLAPS: THEORY, STRATEGIES AND SOLUTIONS 43 (2012) (noting that the
UK “place[s] the barriers in patent law by express prohibition on extending patent monopoly to copyright[ed] works” and that “even the Commonwealth jurisdictions that have not
yet expressly adopted the doctrine of utilitarian functionality are hostile to extending copyright protection to utilitarian objects”); Wendy J. Gordon, How Oracle Erred: Functionality,
Useful Articles, and the Future of Computer Copyright, in COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS (Ruth L. Okediji ed., forthcoming 2017) (long version manuscript
at 5), http://hdl.handle.net/2144/15627 (“Copyright law defers to patent when it comes
to functional use . . . .”); Viva R. Moffat, Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor Patents: The Problem
of Overlapping Intellectual Property Protection, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1473, 1530–32 (2004);
Pamela Samuelson, The Story of Baker v. Selden: Sharpening the Distinction Between Authorship
and Invention, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 159, 186–88 (Jane C. Ginsburg &
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006); Gordon J. Zimmerman, Extending the Monopoly? The
Risks and Benefits of Multiple Forms of Intellectual Property Protection, 17 C.I.P.R. 345, 346 (2001)
(giving a Canadian perspective); McKenna & Sprigman, supra note 4, at 4.
14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. For an extensive discussion of the nature and history of
the IP Clause of the Constitution, see for example EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE
OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE: A STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (2002).
15 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
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(that is, knowledge), whereas patent law’s grant of exclusive rights was
intended to promote the useful arts by protecting inventive advances.16
Recognition of overlapping subject matters and protections in the copyright and utility patent domains is also inconsistent with the statutory
schemes that Congress has created through its enactment of the relevant
laws. In keeping with the constitutional grant, Congress has designated
“original works of authorship” as the statutory subject matter of copyright
law,17 and assigned functional creations—“process[es], machine[s], manufacture[s], or composition[s] of matter”—as the statutory subject matters of
utility patent law.18
The starkly different contours of the copyright and utility patent regimes
evidence Congress’s intent not to create overlaps between copyrights and
utility patents. Copyright protection, for instance, attaches automatically by
operation of law to eligible works of authorship and lasts for at least seven
decades (and usually decades more than that).19 Copyright requires only a
modest level of originality in expression to qualify for protection,20 and one
need not even register claims of copyright with a government office.21 Utility
patent protection, by contrast, can last no more than twenty years and can
only be obtained by applying to the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office
(USPTO) for a grant of rights and satisfying that law’s much more rigorous
standards.22 USPTO examiners must be persuaded that a claimed invention
is novel and nonobvious, both of which are substantially higher qualitative
16 Id.; see, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 4 (1952); S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 3 (1952)
(“The background, the balanced construction, and the usage current then and later, indicate that th[is] constitutional provision is really two provisions merged into one. The purpose of the first provision is to promote the progress of science by securing for limited
times to authors the exclusive right to their writings, the word ‘science’ in this connection
having the meaning of knowledge in general, which is one of its meanings today. The
other provision is that Congress has the power to promote the progress of useful arts by
securing for limited times to inventors the exclusive right to their discoveries.”); see also
Taylor Instrument Cos. v. Fawley-Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98, 99 (7th Cir. 1943) (recognizing
the dual grant embedded in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8).
17 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (setting forth copyright subject matter).
18 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (setting forth patent subject matter). For further discussions
of copyright and patent subject matters and the regimes these laws embody, see for example Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 4, at 4–11; McKenna & Sprigman, supra note 4, at
15–18, 38–47.
19 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . .”). Copyrighted works created by an
author at age twenty-five who lives to ninety-five will be in-copyright under current law for
140 years. Corporate-authored works created since 1978 are in-copyright for ninety-five
years after publication. See id. §§ 302–05 (setting forth duration rules).
20 See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346–47 (1991)
(explaining copyright’s originality standard requires a showing of only a modicum of
creativity).
21 Although registration is not a precondition of copyright protection, U.S. authors
must register claims of copyright to bring an infringement action. 17 U.S.C. § 411.
22 35 U.S.C. §§ 111, 131, 154 (setting forth patent application, examination, and duration rules, respectively).
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hurdles to protectability than copyright’s originality standard.23 In addition,
a patentable invention, unlike a copyrightable writing, must be “useful” (that
is, functional).24
Another significant distinction between these two regimes lies in the
blanket protection that copyright provides to the original expression in works
of authorship without requiring authors to specify the expressive elements of
their works to which copyright extends.25 Patent applicants, by contrast,
must specifically claim elements of their inventions and disclose sufficient
details to enable others to construct embodiments of them.26
Also quite different are the sets of exclusive rights that the copyright and
patent regimes provide to creators. Copyright law grants authors exclusive
rights to control reproductions and distributions of their works, along with
public performances, public displays, and the making of derivative works.27
These exclusive rights are, however, subject to many exceptions and limitations, including, notably, fair use.28 Patent law gives inventors exclusive
rights to control all uses of patented inventions, as well as making, selling,
and offering to sell products embodying the inventions; these rights are subject to far fewer exceptions and limitations than copyright law provides.29
One important implication of patent law’s broad use right is that it treats
independent creators as infringers,30 whereas copyright law regards the inde23 Id. §§ 101–03 (requiring inventions be novel and nonobvious to be patentable); see,
e.g., Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59 (1884) (contrasting copyright’s originality standard with patent law’s novelty and nonobviousness standards).
24 Id. § 101 (requiring that inventions be “useful” to be patentable). In a recent
paper, Professors McKenna and Sprigman “highlight the lack of a coherent theoretical
account of the domain of utility patent law and the resulting problems of operationalizing
a utility patent supremacy principle, where other branches of IP are attempting to render
unto utility patent what is utility patent’s.” McKenna & Sprigman, supra note 4, at 4. McKenna and Sprigman also criticize courts’ failure to articulate a meaningful utility standard,
id. at 15–16, but suggest that there may be some judicial convergence toward recognizing
that technology is at the core of utility patent subject matter, id. at 24.
25 Some commentators have recently argued for more rigorous review of copyright, as
well as other IP, boundaries. See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U.
CHI. L. REV. 719 (2009); Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Scope, 57 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 2197 (2016); Zahr K. Said, Reforming Copyright Interpretation, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 469
(2015).
26 35 U.S.C. §§ 111–12.
27 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). Patent law is more generous than copyright law, however,
as to second-comer improvements. Those who develop improvements of technologies can
patent those improvements, 35 U.S.C. § 101, whereas an author-improver may run afoul of
the derivative work right, 17 U.S.C. § 106(2). See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of
Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989 (1997).
28 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107–22.
29 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
30 See, e.g., Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement,
105 MICH. L. REV. 475 (2006) (arguing for an independent creation defense to patent
infringement, but recognizing that it has not been accepted as a defense).
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pendent creation of the same or substantially similar works as perfectly
lawful.31
The remedies available for infringements are also substantially different.
Prevailing copyright plaintiffs may be awarded a disgorgement of the defendant’s profits, plus actual damages (e.g., a reasonable royalty).32 Prevailing
utility patentees may be awarded reasonable royalties, but not profits disgorgements.33 Copyright owners also have the option, as an alternative to
actual damages and profits disgorgement, to claim statutory damages of up to
$150,000 per infringed work.34 Patent law provides no comparable remedy.
Moreover, those who infringe copyrights may be subject to criminal prosecution if the infringement is willful and for commercial advantage or private
financial gain.35 There is no criminal liability for infringing a patent under
U.S. law.
The remedial advantages of copyright law, as well as its much longer
duration, help to explain why some creators might want to assert both copyright and utility patent protections in the same creation.36 They may also
want to claim copyright protection in utility-patent-eligible but unpatented
functional designs.
Section I.A discusses why these considerations have led some courts to
regard copyright and utility patent subject matters as categorically exclusive.
Under this approach, an intellectual creation is understood to be eligible for
copyright or utility patent protection, but not for both. Section I.B reviews
and criticizes the Nimmer treatise’s endorsement of overlapping copyright
and utility patent subject matters and protections. Section I.C recognizes
that the Supreme Court has been sometimes unreceptive to categorical
exclusivity arguments in IP cases. There are, however, several policy considerations that courts should take into account when trying to discern the
proper boundaries of copyright and utility patent protections as to subject
31 See, e.g., Abraham Drassinower, Authorship as Public Address: On the Specificity of Copyright Vis-à-Vis Patent and Trade-Mark, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 199 (contrasting copyright and
patent law as to independent creation).
32 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)–(b).
33 See Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits from Reasonable Royalties, 51 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 655, 655 (2009).
34 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (requiring courts to impose a minimum statutory damage of
$750 per infringed work and up to $150,000 for willful infringements if plaintiffs opt for
this remedy). Eligibility for statutory damages depends on prompt registration of claims
with the Copyright Office. Id. § 412; see, e.g., Andrew P. Bridges, Navigating the Interface
Between Utility Patents and Copyrights, in OVERLAPPING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
§§ 1.72–.80 (Neil Wilkof & Shamnad Basheer eds., 2012) (discussing the remedial advantages of copyright). Successful copyright plaintiffs are more likely than prevailing patentees to be awarded reasonable attorneys’ fees as well. Id.
35 See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (defining criminal copyright offenses); 18 U.S.C. § 2319
(2012) (setting forth misdemeanor and felony penalties).
36 It is, for example, easier to stop imports of products that infringe copyrights than to
get an order to stop importation of products that infringe patents. See infra note 177 and
accompanying text.
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matters, such as computer programs, that do not fit neatly into either the
copyright or utility patent domains.
A.

Baker v. Selden and the Birth of the Categorical Exclusivity Approach

Courts have long recognized that creators might be tempted to bypass
the rigorous requirements for patenting if they could more easily and
cheaply get much longer-lasting exclusive rights in their innovative products
by asserting copyright in them.37 The Supreme Court’s venerable 1879 decision in Baker v. Selden was the first and is still the most vivid judicial explication of the notion that copyright and utility patent are mutually exclusive
forms of IP protections for intellectual creations.38 The influence of Baker
on copyrightability and scope of protection issues has been deep and longlasting.39
Selden claimed copyright not only in his book, Selden’s Condensed Ledger,
or Bookkeeping Simplified, but also in the bookkeeping system depicted
therein.40 Selden’s novel system was instantiated in the forms published in
his book. W.C.M. Baker published a book containing forms that Selden’s
widow alleged were substantially similar to and copied from those in Selden’s
book.41 Baker appealed a lower court decision in Selden’s favor to the U.S.
Supreme Court.
Owing in no small part to Selden’s acknowledgement in the preface of
his book that he had sought, but apparently not obtained, a patent on that
37 See, e.g., Davis v. Comitti, (1885) 52 L.T. 539, 540 (Ch.) (Eng.) (“It would be strange
if the inventor, who, by means of a patent could obtain a monopoly for his invention for
the term of fourteen years, was enabled to obtain a distinct right of copyright for a period
of at least forty-two years for the letterpress on the dial, or some other essential part of his
invention, and thus, after the expiration of the period for which his patent was granted, be
in a position to restrain the serviceable user of some letterpress which formed an essential
part of his invention. In my opinion the statutes do not lead to any such anomaly.”). More
recent decisions have recognized this risk as well. See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade,
Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1526 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[T]o enjoy a lawful monopoly over the idea or
functional principle [such as a computer program interface] underlying a work, the creator of the [copyrighted] work must satisfy the more stringent standards imposed by the
patent laws.”).
38 Baker, 101 U.S. at 102–03; see also Comitti, 52 L.T. at 540 (rejecting a claim of copyright in a barometer face because it was more properly patent subject matter and distinguishing copyright and patent subject matter); Clarke v. Cocks, discussed infra note 143
and accompanying text.
39 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Why Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processes from the
Scope of Its Protection, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1921 (2007) (explaining the Court’s ruling in Baker
and tracing its influence on later copyright cases).
40 For a discussion of the allegations in Selden’s complaint and how the Court
responded to it, see Samuelson, supra note 13, at 163.
41 Baker, 101 U.S. at 100–01. Examples of Baker’s and Selden’s forms can be found in
Samuelson, supra note 13, at 170–71.
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bookkeeping system,42 the Court reversed and ruled in Baker’s favor.43 The
Court acknowledged that if Selden
had the exclusive right to the use of the system explained in his book, it
would be difficult to contend that the defendant does not infringe it, . . . but
if it be assumed that the system is open to public use, it seems to be equally
difficult to contend that the books made and sold by the defendant are a
violation of the copyright of the complainant’s book considered merely as a
book explanatory of the system.44

In elucidating why Selden’s copyright did not extend that far, the Court
observed that “no one would contend that the copyright” in a “treatise on the
composition and use of medicines, be they old or new; on the construction
and use of ploughs, or watches, or churns; or on the mixture and application
of colors for painting or dyeing; or on the mode of drawing lines to produce
the effect of perspective” would confer on the treatise’s author “the exclusive
right to the art or manufacture described therein.”45 The copyright in such a
treatise would, of course, be valid, but its scope would extend only to the
author’s explanation of the useful art or manufacture, not to the useful art
itself.46 The Court regarded Selden’s claim of copyright in the bookkeeping
system to be contrary to this well-established norm.
The Court recognized that the plausibility of Selden’s claim arose from
the “peculiar nature of the art” in his book.47 Useful arts were usually
embodied in “wood, metal, stone, or some other physical embodiment,” not
in books.48 “But the principle is the same in all.”49 The description of a
useful art in a book “lays no foundation for an exclusive claim to the art
42 For a discussion of the significance of Selden’s application for a patent on the bookkeeping system, see Samuelson, supra note 13, at 173–88.
43 Baker, 101 U.S. at 107.
44 Id. at 100.
45 Id. at 102.
46 Id. at 103–04. In view of the Court’s analysis of Selden’s claim, Baker should be
understood as a segmentation or layering case. See infra Section II.A.
47 Baker, 101 U.S. at 104.
48 Id. at 105. Guthrie v. Curlett is a post-Baker case in which a creator claimed both
utility patent and copyright protection in a consolidated freight index. Guthrie’s first lawsuit against Curlett charged him with infringing a patent on a novel method of compressing information about freight tariffs to make the data more comprehensible. The
Second Circuit struck down the patent for claiming unpatentable subject matter. Guthrie
v. Curlett, 10 F.2d 725, 727 (2d Cir. 1926). After that suit failed, Guthrie sued Curlett to
enforce copyright in his book, arguing that Curlett had copied its contents. The Second
Circuit denied this claim as well, ruling that the freight index was uncopyrightable because
the arrangement was inevitable and methodical in character. See Guthrie v. Curlett, 36
F.2d 694, 695–96 (2d Cir. 1929). The copyright decision does not mention the earlier
patent decision.
49 Baker, 101 U.S. at 104–05 (“In describing the [useful] art, the illustrations and diagrams employed [by Selden] happen to correspond more closely than usual with the actual
work performed by the operator who uses the art. Those illustrations and diagrams consist
of ruled lines and headings of accounts . . . which, in the application of the art, the bookkeeper makes with his pen . . . .”).
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itself,” which “can only be secured, if it can be secured at all, by letters-patent.”50 To obtain an exclusive right to control the practice of a useful art
requires an application for a patent and a willingness to have the inventor’s
claims of novelty subjected to examination.51 “To give to the author of the
book an exclusive property in the [useful] art described therein, when no
examination of its novelty has ever been officially made, would be a surprise
and a fraud upon the public.”52 Indeed, by publishing a book on a useful
art, without getting a patent, its author dedicates that useful art to the public
domain.53 Thus, owing to the lack of an issued utility patent, Selden’s bookkeeping system, once revealed in his published book, was in the public
domain.
The Seventh Circuit heeded Baker’s directive on copyright/utility patent
exclusivity in Taylor Instrument Co. v. Fawley-Brost Co.54 Taylor manufactured
temperature recording machines, whose elements included a thermometer,
a writing stylus, a mechanism for advancing the stylus in response to changes
in temperature, and charts with lines and arcs on which the stylus recorded
the temperature.55 Taylor registered its claim of copyright in hundreds of
charts for its machines and put copyright notices on the copies sold to the
public.56 Fawley-Brost produced identical charts and offered them as competitive alternatives to the Taylor charts. This prompted Taylor to sue Fawley-Brost for infringement.57 The lower court upheld Taylor’s claim and
enjoined Fawley-Brost from manufacturing infringing charts.58 The Seventh
Circuit reversed.
The appellate court began its Taylor opinion by reciting Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution and observing that Congress had
exercised the power granted by this clause by enacting copyright laws to protect the writings of authors and by enacting patent laws to protect the discoveries of inventors.59 It then noted:
50 Id. at 105. The Court could have reinforced its categorical approach to the separateness of the copyright and patent domains by pointing to the word “respective” in the
constitutional clause, which authorizes Congress to grant exclusive rights to authors and
inventors in “their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
51 Baker, 101 U.S. at 102.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 103.
54 139 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1943).
55 Id. at 99.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 98–99. Fawley-Brost also copied the numbers that Taylor had assigned to each
form so that consumers would know which chart to use with which Taylor machine. Id.
Taylor was thus a pre-software interoperability case. It also presaged later cases claiming
copyright in numbering systems for uncopyrightable products. See, e.g., ATC Distrib. Grp.,
Inc. v. Whatever It Takes Transmissions & Parts, Inc., 402 F.3d 700 (6th Cir. 2005)
(rejecting a copyright claim in a hardware part name and numbering system).
58 Taylor, 139 F.2d at 98–99. This would seem to be an example of the exclusion type
of functionality screen described in Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 4, at 3.
59 Taylor, 139 F.2d at 99.
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While it may be difficult to determine in which field protection must be
sought, it is plain, so we think, that it must be in one or the other; it cannot
be found in both. In other words, there is no overlapping territory, even
though the line of separation may in some instances be difficult of exact
ascertainment.60

After quoting Baker at some length and citing to several of its progeny,61
the Seventh Circuit concluded that the chart at issue “neither teaches nor
explains the use of the art. It is an essential element of the machine; it is the
art itself.”62 The court took note of twenty-five patents on temperature
recording devices with charts that Fawley-Brost introduced into evidence to
demonstrate that such charts were patent, not copyright, subject matter.63
Although Taylor sought to distinguish his charts from those patents, the
Seventh Circuit perceived that by making changes to its machines and the
accompanying charts, Taylor had “produced the intolerable situation that
plaintiff may extend indefinitely the fifty-six years of protection afforded by
the copyright laws.”64 Taylor’s charts having long ago lost their patentable
status, its copyright claims could not prevail.65 Thus was Fawley-Brost’s categorical exclusivity defense vindicated.
B.

Commentary Endorsing Overlaps in Copyright and Utility Patent Protections

The authors of two treatises on American copyright law have endorsed
the possibility of overlap between copyright and utility patent protections in
contravention to the teachings of Baker and Taylor. The first was the early
twentieth-century Weil treatise:
60 Id.
61 Id. at 99–100. Among the Baker progeny cited positively in Taylor were Brief English
Sys., Inc. v. Owen, 48 F.2d 555, 556 (2d Cir. 1931) (holding that a shorthand system was
not copyright-protectable); Amberg File & Index Co. v. Shea Smith & Co., 82 F. 314, 315
(7th Cir. 1897) (holding that a file system was not copyright-protectable); and Muller v.
Triborough Bridge Auth., 43 F. Supp. 298, 299–300 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (holding that a bridgeapproach design was not copyright-protectable).
62 Taylor, 139 F.2d at 100; see also Brown Instrument Co. v. Warner, 161 F.2d 910 (D.C.
Cir. 1947) (approving Taylor and upholding decision to refuse registration to patentable
recording charts); see also infra Section II.D (discussing the Office’s denial of registration to
genetically engineered DNA sequences based in part on the patentability of these
sequences).
63 Fawley-Brost’s strategy of bringing forth issued patents as evidence that copyright
should not be recognized in some subject matters is consistent with the approach discussed
infra Section II.E.
64 Taylor, 139 F.2d at 101; see also Brown, 161 F.2d at 911 (“Both law and policy forbid
monopolizing a machine except within the comparatively narrow limits of the patent
system.”).
65 Taylor also lost on its trademark claims. The Seventh Circuit recognized that Fawley-Brost had printed a “T” along with relevant numbers on its charts to indicate to consumers in which Taylor machines the Fawley-Brost charts would work, saying “the use of
the letter was to show destination rather than origin of the chart.” Taylor, 139 F.2d at 101.
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While in doubtful cases the Courts will hold that, presumptively, the fact that
a given work is patentable is ground for holding it is not copyrightable, and
vice versa, it seems that there is no rule of law nor is there any consideration
of public policy which will prevent the issuance of both a copyright and a
patent to cover the same work, in its different aspects, in a proper case.66

Weil offered this hypothetical in support of this proposition:
A novel household utensil may be modeled by a great sculptor. Its form may
be artistic in the highest degree; its machinery may show the qualities necessary to patentability; its use may be purely utilitarian and it may be so constructed as to be one inseparable unit. In such event it should be both
copyrightable and patentable.67

The only source Weil cited in support of this theory of copyright/patent
overlap was Louis De Jonge & Co. v. Breuker & Kessler Co.68 That case did not
involve a claim of copyright in a design that was eligible for a utility patent, as
Weil implied. Rather, the claim was that Breuker & Kessler (B&K) infringed
De Jonge’s copyright in a pictorial design of sprigs of holly, mistletoe, and
spruce that had initially been embodied in a painting. The Court simply
noted that design patent protection might have been available for De Jonge’s
design for wrapping paper, although the company had not sought such protection. De Jonge’s claim for copyright infringement against B&K failed
because it had elected to claim copyright protection in the design, and then
failed to place copyright notices on all copies of the wrapping paper, as that
law required.69 The De Jonge decision is far from a ringing endorsement of
the overlap of copyright and utility patent protections that Weil intimated.
66 ARTHUR W. WEIL, AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW § 205, at 84 (1917). The Supreme
Court’s Baker decision provided both legal and policy reasons why copyright and utility
patent protections should not overlap. Even though Weil endorsed overlapping copyright
and patent protection, he nevertheless contemplated that these two laws would protect
“different aspects” of the design. Id. Weil also distinguished the roles of copyright and
utility patent law when imagining a future in which “talking machines” might enable the
development of read-aloud books. The literary content of the talking books would be protectable by copyright law, while the mechanical parts would be protectable by utility patent
law. Id.
67 Id. § 205, at 84–85. By emphasizing the “purely utilitarian” nature of the hypothetical utensil, Weil was implicitly conceptualizing this tool as utility patent subject matter, not
as design patent subject matter. Under the 1976 Act, Weil’s hypothetical utensil would
almost certainly be uncopyrightable insofar as its aesthetic and utilitarian design elements
were “inseparable.” See, e.g., Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., 755 F.3d 1038, 1042
(9th Cir. 2014) (“Although Inhale’s [hookah pipe] water container, like a piece of modern
sculpture, has a distinctive shape, ‘[t]he shape of the alleged “artistic features” and of the
useful article are one and the same.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM II: COMPENDIUM OF COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 505.03
(1984))); Bonazoli v. R.S.V.P. Int’l, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 2d 218, 228 (D.R.I. 2005) (finding
heart-shaped measuring spoons to be uncopyrightable because their aesthetic features
were inseparable from their functionality); see also infra Section II.C.
68 182 F. 150 (E.D. Pa. 1910), aff’d, 191 F. 35 (3d Cir. 1911), aff’d, 235 U.S. 33 (1914);
see also WEIL, supra note 66, at 85 n.98.
69 De Jonge, 235 U.S. at 35–36.
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Like the Weil treatise before it, the Nimmer treatise has, for the past
fifty-some years, asserted that copyright and utility patent law can provide
overlapping protections to intellectual creations.70 Although noting that this
overlap was “most apparent” as to copyrights and design patents,71 the Nimmer treatise asserted that the principle was more broadly applicable: “The
Supreme Court has held that a work such as a work of art may be eligible for
either copyright or patent protection, and other courts both prior and subsequent to the Supreme Court’s decision have similarly held, although one
older decision is to the contrary.”72
The Supreme Court decision to which the treatise referred was Mazer v.
Stein.73 The Court in Mazer upheld Stein’s claim of copyright in a Balinese
dancer statuette as a work of art,74 even though that design was also eligible
for design patent protection as an ornamental design for an article of manufacture,75 namely, as a base for lamps. Reading Baker broadly, Mazer argued
that Stein should be able to get exclusive rights to manufacture lamps
embodying that design only by obtaining a design patent, and Stein’s failure
to patent that design meant it was in the public domain.76 The Court
rejected Mazer’s categorical exclusivity argument, saying: “Neither the Copyright Statute nor any other says that because a thing is patentable it may not
be copyrighted. We should not so hold.”77
Three of the four cases the treatise cited in support of overlapping copyright and utility patent protections were, like Mazer, decisions in which courts
70 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 38, at 162 (1963). The title of that
section is “Copyrightability for Patentable Works.”
71 Id. Commentators disagree about how much overlap exists in copyright and design
patent subject matters. Some regard the design patent/copyright overlap as very substantial. See, e.g., Justin Hughes, Cognitive and Aesthetic Functionality in Trademark Law, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1227, 1269 (2015) (“[D]ouble protection is arguably the norm . . . .”).
Others take a narrower view of this overlap because copyright law’s useful article doctrine
excludes from protection many designs that have both functional and expressive elements.
See, e.g., Moffat, supra note 5, at 611–12. For a discussion of useful article copyright issues,
see generally Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to
Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707 (1983); J.H. Reichman, Design Protection in
Domestic and Foreign Copyright Law: From the Berne Revision of 1948 to the Copyright Act of 1976,
1983 DUKE L.J. 1143.
72 NIMMER, supra note 70, at 162–63 (footnotes omitted). The most recent edition of
the Nimmer treatise includes this same statement and relies on the same cases as the 1963
edition. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 11, § 2A.07[A]. Although its treatment of Baker
has been revised, the treatise continues to assert that patentable works can be copyrighted.
Id. § 2A.07[A]–[B]. The Nimmer treatise thus seems not to accept the principle that utility patents should regulate functional designs, as articulated in McKenna & Sprigman,
supra note 4, and endorsed in cases such as Baker and Taylor.
73 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
74 Id. at 217.
75 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2012) (identifying “new, original and ornamental design for an
article of manufacture” as design patent subject matter).
76 Mazer, 347 U.S. at 215–16.
77 Id. at 217.
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acknowledged that the designs at issue might have been eligible for both
copyright and design patent protections, although in none of these cases was
the design concurrently protected by both laws.78 The fourth of these cases
did not have a similar holding to Mazer, instead denying trademark protection to a table deck design because of its functionality.79 None of these cases
had anything to say about possible overlaps of copyright and utility patent
protections.
The “older” case to which the treatise referred was Taylor.80 That decision had, as shown earlier, followed Baker by rejecting claims of copyright in
temperature recording charts because they were essential parts of machines
and similar to charts that had been covered by utility patents.81 By characterizing Taylor as an “older” case and implying that it was the only case to have
rejected copyright/patent overlaps, as well as by citing to Mazer and characterizing four other cases as having upheld copyright/patent overlaps, the
treatise implied that Taylor was no longer good law.
Taylor was not, however, the only such decision. A few years before
Mazer and after Taylor, the D.C. Circuit invoked both Taylor and Baker in
upholding the Copyright Office’s refusal to register copyrights in patentable
recording charts in Brown Instrument Co. v. Warner.82 As the D.C. Circuit
explained:
78 The pre-Mazer cases cited by the Nimmer treatise as having held similarly to Mazer
were William A. Meier Glass Co. v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 95 F. Supp. 264 (W.D. Pa.
1951) (holding that the plaintiff’s failure to acquire either a design patent or copyright
protection meant that the glassware design was in the public domain); and Jones Bros. Co. v.
Underkoffler, 16 F. Supp. 729 (M.D. Pa. 1936) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the
plaintiff’s monumental headstone was unprotectable by copyright law because it could
have been design-patented). NIMMER, supra note 70, at 163 n.742. A post-Mazer case cited
by the treatise was Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch Co., 260
F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1958) (affirming a lower court judgment that the defendant had
infringed a design patent, but deferring to the Copyright Office’s decision not to register
plaintiff’s watch face design as work of art), cited in NIMMER, supra note 70, at 163 n.743.
There is nothing in those opinions to suggest that any of the designs at issue would have
been eligible for utility patent protection.
79 See In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496 (C.C.P.A. 1961); NIMMER, supra
note 70, at 163 n.743 (citing Deister). Deister did refer to Mazer in a footnote as having
accepted that design patent and copyright could have overlapping subject matters. Deister,
289 F.2d at 500 n.2. By rejecting a claim of trademark protection for a table design
because of its functionality, the holding in Deister was closer in spirit to Baker than to Mazer.
80 Taylor Instrument Co. v. Fawley-Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1943); see NIMMER,
supra note 70, at 163 n.744 (citing Taylor).
81 See supra notes 54–65 and accompanying text.
82 161 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1947). The D.C. Circuit said Baker “controlled” the outcome in Brown because both cases involved forms designed to record information. Id. at
911. In its decision, the Brown court noted the district court’s finding that
[t]he 83 charts in suit function as working mechanical elements of and essential
parts of recording machines manufactured by plaintiff. . . . The printed matter on
the 83 charts in suit constitutes blank graph paper ruled according to the
mechanical characteristics of the particular machines in which each is intended
to be used. . . . The charts in suit were based upon mathematical or scientific
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Both law and policy forbid monopolizing a machine except within the comparatively narrow limits of the patent system. In several patents on recording
machines, the necessary printed chart is rightly claimed as one of the operative elements. Since the machines which cooperate with the charts in suit
are useless without them, to copyright the charts would in effect continue
appellant’s monopoly of its machines beyond the time authorized by the
patent law.83

The charts were consequently uncopyrightable, and the Copyright Office
had properly rejected Brown’s registration application.
More significant than the Nimmer treatise’s failure to recognize Brown
was its failure to acknowledge that the Supreme Court in Mazer had cited
approvingly to both Taylor and Brown. Indeed, the Court distinguished the
rulings in Taylor and Brown from the claims in Mazer on the ground that
those decisions had held that “the Mechanical Patent Law and Copyright
Laws are mutually exclusive,”84 a proposition in which the Court apparently
concurred. In view of this, Mazer should be understood as a fourth appellate
court decision, along with Baker, Taylor, and Brown, that has conceptualized
copyright and utility patents as separate IP domains.85
The Court in Mazer also contrasted Taylor and Brown with the De Jonge
case in which the Court had previously acknowledged some overlap in the
subject matters of copyright and design patent laws.86 Mazer and De Jonge may
have accepted the existence of some overlap in the categories of ornamental
designs for manufactured products and works of art. However, the BakerTaylor-Brown-Mazer quartet of appellate court decisions have treated the subject matters of copyright and utility patent laws as nonoverlapping. The Nimmer treatise also ignored Mazer’s approving citation to two other Bakerinspired precedents whose holdings were predicated on the mutual exclusivcalculations, but their object is for use as parts of the plaintiff’s machines and not
for the purpose of giving information. . . . Plaintiff has failed to establish that its
charts are ‘writings of an author’ or ‘drawings’ within the meaning of the Constitution and the copyright statute, or that said charts convey or are capable of conveying the thought of an author.
Id. at 910–11.
83 Id. at 911. This is an example of the exclusion type of functionality screen described
in Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 4, at 3.
84 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 215 n.33 (1954) (emphasis added). The Copyright
Office brief to the Supreme Court in Mazer likewise distinguished Taylor and Brown as cases
holding that utility patent and copyright were mutually exclusive. See Brief for the Register
of Copyrights as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 46 n.19, Mazer, 347 U.S. 201
(No. 228) [hereinafter Copyright Office Brief].
85 The 2016 version of the Nimmer treatise now says that there may be “some merit” in
Taylor’s rejection of overlapping copyright and utility patent protections. Yet, in seeming
contradiction to this proposition, it continues to assert that copyright and utility patent
protections can overlap. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 11, §§ 2A.05[A][1][e],
2A.05[B][2], 2A.07[A]. The revised treatise does acknowledge that some intellectual creations, such as mechanical devices, are more suitable for utility patent than copyright protections. Id. § 2A.12 (citing cases).
86 Mazer, 347 U.S. at 215 n.33.
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ity of copyright and utility patent subject matters.87 Both cases, like Taylor
and Brown, explicitly traced the basis for their copyright/utility patent exclusivity holdings to Baker.88
The Nimmer treatise characterized as “more difficult” the question of
whether creators should have to elect one form of protection or could have
both at the same time.89 It noted that the Supreme Court in Mazer had
raised, but decided not to answer, that question.90 Although the treatise
indicated that Mazer had cited to several cases on the election theory, it
neglected to mention that all of them had endorsed an election of protection
as between copyright and design patent protection.91 The treatise identified
only one case, Korzybski v. Underwood & Underwood, Inc.,92 as having required
an election of copyright or patent protection, a ruling the treatise characterized as “questionable.”93 In Nimmer’s view, obtaining a utility patent should
not divest a creator of copyright protection. All that should be necessary to
maintain copyright on patented products was to put a copyright notice on
the work.94
87 Id. at 217 n.39 (citing Fulmer v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 1021, 1021–22 (Ct. Cl.
1952) (holding that Fulmer could only get exclusive rights for his parachute design by
obtaining a utility patent; a copyright in drawings of the design did not give him exclusive
rights to control the manufacture of parachutes embodying the design); and then citing
Muller v. Triborough Bridge Auth., 43 F. Supp. 298, 299–300 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (holding that
Muller could only get exclusive rights to control the manufacture of a bridge-approach
design if he got a patent; he could not get such rights through his copyright in drawings)).
The Copyright Office brief also cited approvingly to Fulmer and Muller. Copyright Office
Brief, supra note 84, at 36; see also Modern Aids, Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 264 F.2d 93, 94
(2d Cir. 1959) (per curiam) (holding that copying a picture of a mechanical massage
machine in an ad infringed, but that the defendant was free to copy and sell the same
unpatented machine in competition with the plaintiff); Nat’l Med. Care, Inc. v. Espiritu,
284 F. Supp. 2d 424, 435–38 (S.D. W. Va. 2003) (finding a copyright in a technical drawing
was not infringed by the construction of a similar cabinet for a dialysis center); Seip v.
Commonwealth Plastics, Inc. 85 F. Supp. 741, 741–42 (D. Mass. 1949) (holding that manufacture of a toy whistle, which the defendant had patented, did not infringe copyright in
the plaintiff’s drawing).
88 Fulmer, 103 F. Supp. at 1022; Muller, 43 F. Supp. at 299–300.
89 NIMMER, supra note 70, at 163.
90 See id.; see also Mazer, 347 U.S. at 217.
91 Id. at 217 n.37. The cases were Louis De Jonge & Co. v. Breuker & Kessler Co., 235 U.S.
33, 36 (1914); Korzybski v. Underwood & Underwood, Inc., 36 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1929); In re
Blood, 23 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1927); Jones Bros. Co. v. Underkoffler, 16 F. Supp. 729, 731 (M.D.
Pa. 1936). The Court also provided a cf. cite to Taylor on the election of protection issue.
The Copyright Office amicus brief in Mazer also endorsed requiring election of copyright
or design patent protection and rejected the availability of overlapping protections. See
Copyright Office Brief, supra note 84, at 36.
92 36 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1929).
93 NIMMER, supra note 70, at 163 & n.746. Korzybski is discussed infra Section II.B.
94 NIMMER, supra note 70, at 163. Prior to 1989, the failure to put copyright notices on
published copies of protected works resulted in dedication of the works to the public
domain. See infra note 98 for current Copyright Office policy on this issue.
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In an effort to further undermine the election of protection theory, the
Nimmer treatise dropped a footnote saying that the Second Circuit’s decision in Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch Co. had
“suggested” that Korzybski was no longer valid law. 95 A careful reading of the
Vacheron decision, however, reveals that the court merely said that it was
unnecessary to address whether the watchmaker had to make an election of
copyright or design patent protection because the Copyright Office had
refused to register Vacheron’s claim of copyright in its watch design.96
The treatise also criticized the Copyright Office for its refusal to register
claims in designs that had been design-patented, saying that there was “no
statutory or other justification” for the policy.97 The Copyright Office policy
was, however, longstanding and based on several appellate court decisions
that had applied or endorsed the election of a design patent or copyright
protections requirement.98 The public policy ground on which the Office
relied was “based on the theory that it is an undue extension of the patent
monopoly to allow, after the patent has expired, a copyright for the same
design.”99 Extending a design patent monopoly by tacking onto it the much
longer term of copyrights would prevent the public from exploiting a design
that, as a matter of design patent law, should be in the public domain.100
The Nimmer treatise also viewed the Copyright Office regulations as
being contrary to the “teachings” of the Vacheron decision, which it said had
“suggest[ed]” that if a patent on a design was invalidated, copyright should
95 NIMMER, supra note 70, at 163 & n.747 (citing Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre
Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch Co., 260 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1958)). The treatise did not
explain why Nimmer thought that Vacheron called the holding in Korzybski into question,
and indeed, it did not do so.
96 Vacheron, 260 F.2d at 642.
97 NIMMER, supra note 70, at 163–64.
98 See Registrability of Pictorial, Graphic, or Sculptural Works Where a Design Patent
Has Been Issued, 60 Fed. Reg. 15,605, 15,606 (Mar. 24, 1995) (citing to De Jonge and other
election of protection cases). The Office maintained this policy for several decades in
reliance on Korzybski. Id. The Office changed the policy in 1995. Id.
99 Id. Similarly, during the copyright law revision process leading to the Copyright Act
of 1976, the Department of Justice opposed, on policy grounds, a section of the proposed
legislation that would have created a short, copyright-like form of protection for original
designs of useful articles. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 49–50 (noting the Justice Department’s testimony that the proposed legislation “would create a new monopoly which has
not been justified by a showing that its benefits will outweigh the disadvantages of removing such designs from free public use”).
100 When the Office finally discontinued its election of design patent or copyright protection registration policy in 1995, 60 Fed. Reg. at 15,606, it quoted from the 1994 edition
of the Nimmer treatise in the very same words as published in the 1963 treatise, id. The
first appellate court decision to uphold dual protection for the same design under both
copyright and design patent laws was In re Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389 (C.C.P.A. 1974), which
held that a design patent could issue for a copyrighted design for an ornamental design of
a watch face. The Office persisted in its election of protection policy for more than twenty
years after Yardley. For a criticism of Yardley, see for example Michael J. Kline, Requiring an
Election of Protection for Patentable/Copyrightable Computer Programs, 6 COMPUTER L.J. 607,
621–25 (1986).
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still be available.101 This is not even close to what the Second Circuit in the
Vacheron decision said. It merely decided that the Copyright Office had not
erred in denying a watchmaker a chance to register his claim of copyright
protection in the face of one of its watches.102 The court made no such
“suggest[ion].”
In support of its assertion that copyright could subsist in a design for
which utility patent protection had expired, the treatise cited to Barton Candy
Corp. v. Tell Chocolate Novelties Corp. as having “suggest[ed]” this result.103
The treatise starkly mischaracterized both the holding and dictum in Barton.
The holding was that Tell did not infringe Barton’s copyright because its
greeting cards featured “totally different expression[s]” in its pictorial
designs as compared with those on Barton’s cards.104 The court mentioned
that the shape and form of the container for inserting chocolate bars into
greeting cards had once been the subject of a utility patent, although the
court made clear that Barton’s copyright did not extend to this aspect of its
greeting card.105 Properly interpreted, Barton does not support the treatise’s
assertion that copyright protection is available for the subject matter of an
expired utility patent; indeed, it should be understood as rejecting that very
proposition.106
Until 2016, the Nimmer treatise featured an extensive critique of the
Baker decision.107 Prior versions of the treatise characterized the ruling in
Baker as justified because Baker’s forms “substantially differed” from Selden’s
and hence were noninfringing,108 even though the Court in Baker said that
Baker’s forms were similar enough to Selden’s that if Selden was right that
the copyright in his book extended to his bookkeeping system, Baker would
101 NIMMER, supra note 70, at 164 & n.751 (citing Vacheron, 260 F.2d 637).
102 Vacheron, 260 F.2d at 642. The court in Vacheron upheld a finding of design patent
infringement.
103 178 F. Supp. 577 (E.D.N.Y. 1959); see NIMMER, supra note 70, at 164 n.750 (citing
Barton); see also infra notes 184–97 and accompanying text for a discussion of a creator
who had some success in asserting copyright in the subject matter of an expired utility
patent.
104 Barton, 178 F. Supp. at 581–82.
105 Id. The expired patent was mentioned. Id. at 581 n.3. The court noted that the
form and shape of Barton’s container was not protected by copyright or patent. Id. at 581.
106 The 2016 version of the Nimmer treatise continues to cite to Barton for the same
proposition. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 11, § 2A.07[B]. Seemingly to buttress its claim
that copyright law can protect the subject matter of an expired utility patent, the treatise
now cites to Knickerbocker Toy Co. v. Winterbrook Corp., 554 F. Supp. 1309 (D.N.H. 1982).
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 11, § 2A.07[B], at 2A-57 n.36. Knickerbocker involved a claim
of copyright in Raggedy Ann dolls, a much earlier iteration of which had been the subject
of a now-expired design patent. Knickerbocker, 554 F. Supp. at 1312. Knickerbocker does not,
however, support the proposition that copyright protection is available for the subject matter of an expired utility patent.
107 NIMMER, supra note 70, § 37.3–37.4, at 153–57.
108 Id. at 155.
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likely have been an infringer.109 The pre-2016 versions of the treatise
asserted that the Supreme Court’s Mazer decision substantially curtailed the
reach of the Baker ruling. The “proper” scope of Baker after Mazer was, as the
treatise has long interpreted it, that others were free to copy “the idea” in a
copyrighted work, but not its expression.110
I have elsewhere criticized at some length the Nimmer treatise’s interpretation of Baker and shown that Congress codified the Baker holding in the
Copyright Act of 1976 (“1976 Act”).111 The treatise recently substantially
revised its description and characterization of Baker and its progeny in a manner that is closer to my conception of Baker.112 However, it has not changed
its position about overlapping copyright and utility patent protections.113
The revised treatise now acknowledges that extending copyright protection
to “functional activities” may give rise to “evils of monopol[y]” that should be
avoided.114 But unlike the Goldstein treatise, the Nimmer treatise does not
tie the “evils of monopoly” concern to the longstanding policy of channeling
109 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 101 (1879). Selden’s claim was that “no one can use
the system without using substantially the same ruled lines and headings which he has
appended to his books in illustration of it,” and because these ruled lines and headings are
part of the book in which Selden owned copyright, his claim was that “no one can make or
use similar ruled lines and headings, or ruled lines and headings made and arranged on
substantially the same system, without violating the copyright.” Id. at 101.
110 NIMMER, supra note 70, § 37.4, at 156.
111 See Samuelson, supra note 39, at 1924–36, 1944–61; see also J.H. Reichman, Computer
Programs as Applied Scientific Know-How: Implications of Copyright Protection for Commercialized
University Research, 42 VAND. L. REV. 639, 693 n.288 (1989) (characterizing Nimmer’s interpretation of Baker as fallacious); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expression, 111
HARV. L. REV. 1149, 1174–76, 1179–80 (1998) (finding no support for the Nimmer treatise’s interpretation of Baker). Professor Wendy Gordon has recently weighed in with a
similar critique. See Gordon, supra note 13 (long version manuscript at 18–21) (disagreeing with the Nimmer treatise’s position on Baker and the use/explanation distinction).
112 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 11, § 2A.05. The revised treatise at long last features
some cases in which courts have held that methods and systems, not just abstract ideas, are
unprotectable by copyright law. Id. It has renounced the interpretation of Mazer as having
narrowed the ruling in Baker. Id. § 2A.05[B][1]. Although these are steps in the right
direction, I disagree with the revised treatise’s characterization of Mazer as having “unambiguously reject[ed]” the argument that “the utilitarian nature of a work might interfere
with its eligibility for copyright protection.” Id. The Court in Mazer merely decided that
the statuette could be copyrighted as a work of art, despite the facts that it was mass-produced and that the principal market for its exploitation was as the base of a lamp. See
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 204–05 (1954). The Court did not regard the Balinese
dancer statuette as a utilitarian work. Id. (“The case requires an answer, not as to a manufacturer’s right to register a lamp base but as to an artist’s right to copyright a work of art
intended to be reproduced for lamp bases.”).
113 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 11, § 2A.07[A]–[B]. The revised treatise continues
to say that Barton “suggest[ed]” that copyright protection is available for the subject matter
of an expired utility patent. Id. § 2A.07 [B], at 2A-57 n.36. See supra notes 103–06 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the error in the treatise’s treatment of Barton.
114 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 11, § 2A.03[B].
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grants of exclusive rights in functional designs away from copyright and into
the utility patent regime.115
C.

Some Reflections on Why Copyright and Utility Patent Domains
Should Not Overlap

The Nimmer treatise’s analysis of the copyright/utility patent overlap
issue may be deeply flawed and unconvincing, but that does not, of course,
mean that it is entirely wrong. Quite telling, however, is the fact that in the
more than fifty years since the treatise was first published, there has been no
reported decision in which courts have upheld overlapping copyright and
utility patent protections in the same intellectual creation.
Some defendants have made categorical exclusivity arguments to the
Supreme Court in some post-Mazer IP cases, but the Court has not found
these arguments persuasive. In TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.,
for instance, the Court was unwilling to say that the existence of a utility
patent for a product configuration, whether in force or expired, should necessarily foreclose trade dress protection for that design.116 TrafFix relied
upon the expiration of a utility patent on the dual spring sign at issue as
preclusive of judicial recognition of trade dress protection for the same
design.117 The Court decided it was unnecessary to reach this issue.118 Yet,
the Court characterized the existence of a utility patent as “strong evidence”
that a product configuration was too functional to be protectable trade
dress.119 A categorical exclusivity argument was more directly shot down in
J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., in which the Court
rejected J.E.M.’s argument that novel plants should not be the subject matter
of utility patent protections because Congress intended for plant breeder creations to be protected only under the Plant Variety Protection Act.120
The Supreme Court has not since Baker ruled on copyright/utility patent categorical exclusivity defenses, although they have been raised in some
computer software cases. In 1995, the Court split 4-4 in Lotus Development
Corp. v. Borland International, Inc.,121 seemingly unpersuaded by Borland’s
Baker-based categorical exclusivity defense. Borland argued that it had not
infringed copyright in the Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet program because the features it copied—namely, the Lotus command hierarchy and macro system—
115 See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 2.15, at 2:177 (3d ed. 2015).
116 532 U.S. 23, 29–30, 34–35 (2001).
117 Id. at 26, 35. The Tenth Circuit had taken a categorical exclusivity approach to
trade dress and utility patent protection in Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft
Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1500 (10th Cir. 1995). Some amicus curiae briefs in TrafFix urged this
approach as well. See 532 U.S. at 35.
118 532 U.S. at 35.
119 Id. at 29.
120 534 U.S. 124, 127 (2001).
121 516 U.S. 233 (1996) (per curiam).
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were patent, not copyright, subject matter.122 Twenty years later, the Court
declined to review the Federal Circuit’s deeply flawed decision in Oracle
America, Inc. v. Google Inc., in which one of Google’s defenses was that computer program interfaces, such as the Java application program interface elements implemented in its Android smart phone software, were patent, not
copyright, subject matter.123 The Court’s reluctance to address the copyright/utility patent boundary issue in those cases may partly be due to the
highly functional and technically complicated nature of computer software,
which makes it difficult for courts to distinguish which elements of computer
programs are eligible for protection as copyrightable expression and which
elements are protectable, if at all, by utility patents.124 It also does not help,
as Professors McKenna and Sprigman have noted, that utility patent law lacks
a coherent conception about the utility required for an inventor to be eligible for this kind of exclusive right.125
The Supreme Court’s reluctance to embrace categorical exclusivity arguments in these cases does not, however, justify a Nimmer-like acceptance of
overlaps in copyright and utility patent subject matters or protections.
Courts have long recognized numerous policy rationales for maintaining distinct boundaries as between copyright and utility patents arising mainly from
the many significant differences between the copyright and utility patent
regimes. These differences are not accidental incidents of two unrelated statutory schemes, but rather fundamental to achieving the innovation-promoting objectives for which each of these laws was enacted.126 Copyright law is
designed to induce the creation and dissemination of a plethora of original
artistic and literary works, while patent law is designed to induce investment

122 Brief for Respondent, Lotus, 516 U.S. 233 (No. 94-2003), 1995 WL 728538, at
*22–37.
123 750 F.3d 1339, 1379–81 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2887 (2015). The
Federal Circuit rejected Google’s categorical exclusivity argument in this decision. The
Oracle decision’s treatment of the patent/copyright overlap issue is criticized at length in
Pamela Samuelson, Functionality and Expression in Computer Programs: Refining the Tests for
Software Copyright Infringement, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at
46), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2667740. It explains why the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s reliance on Mazer in support of its overlapping protection theory is flawed.
The Nimmer treatise, however, cites approvingly to the Federal Circuit’s Oracle decision on
this issue. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 11, § 2.07[A], at 2A-56.
124 For an extensive effort to explore the functionality limits of copyright scope in computer program cases, see for example Samuelson, supra note 123 (manuscript at 6–46).
The 2016 version of the Nimmer treatise recognizes that, as a practical matter, “demarcating the true domains of patent and copyright so as to treat a claimant’s choice as preclusive, may prove difficult to impossible.” See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 11, § 2.07[A], at
2A-55. I have sought to do this in recent work.
125 McKenna & Sprigman, supra note 4, at 10–11.
126 See, e.g., David Fagundes & Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Intellectual Property, 65 VAND. L.
REV. 677 (2012) (analyzing justifications for the costliness of getting patents and the low
costs of copyrights).
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in and disclosure of significant advances in the technological arts.127 The
policies underlying these two regimes would be substantially thwarted if overlaps in copyright and utility patent subject matters and protections were
recognized.
Patent durations, for example, are far shorter than copyrights for a good
reason. The law allows inventors of new technologies a reasonable opportunity to recoup their investments, but patent law’s shorter duration allows second comers to freely use and build upon existing technology designs when
the patent term ends.128 Competition and ongoing innovation depend on
this freedom to operate in the general products marketplace, a freedom that
would be thwarted if copyright protection extended the patent monopoly by
several decades.129
Incentives to utilize the patent system to obtain exclusive rights in one’s
technological innovations would also be undermined if inventors could get
exclusive rights to their useful innovations merely by embodying them in
copyrighted works.130 The USPTO database provides actual and constructive
notice of the existence of exclusive rights in technology innovations.131
Members of the public need to be able to rely upon this centralized database
to determine whether patents have issued in specific technology domains. As
the Supreme Court recognized nearly 140 years ago in Baker, it would be “a
surprise and a fraud upon the public” to allow authors of writings to get
patent-like protections for useful arts that might be described or otherwise
depicted in copyrighted works.132
Consider also this admonition from the Supreme Court’s decision in
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.: “The novelty and nonobviousness
requirements of patentability embody a congressional understanding,
implicit in the Patent Clause itself, that the free exploitation of ideas will be
the rule, to which the protection of a federal patent is the exception.”133
The Court observed that “[t]he attractiveness of [the patent] bargain, and its
effectiveness in inducing creative effort and disclosure of the results of that
effort, depend almost entirely on a backdrop of free competition in the
127 See, e.g., Paul Goldstein, Infringement of Copyright in Computer Programs, 47 U. PITT. L.
REV. 1119, 1122–23 (1985).
128 See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230–33 (1964) (holding
that an unpatented pole lamp design would be in the public domain after the patent
expired or was invalidated). See generally J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and
Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2448–53 (1994).
129 See, e.g., Sears, 376 U.S. at 230–31 (holding that the public has a right to copy products not subject to patents or copyrights); see also supra notes 19–24 and accompanying
text.
130 See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 161–62 (1989)
(emphasizing the importance of the USPTO as a central repository of the existing state of
the technological arts by giving notice to the public about what is patented).
131 Id. at 151 (“To a limited extent, the federal patent laws must determine not only
what is protected, but also what is free for all to use.”).
132 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879).
133 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 151.
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exploitation of unpatented designs and innovations.”134 The exclusion of
utility patent subject matters from the subject matter and scope of copyright
preserves this freedom to use unpatented technologies and those in which
utility patents have expired.135 Allowing creators to get both copyright and
utility patent protections in the same creations would undermine achieving
the policy objectives these laws are intended to attain.
More particularly, utility patent law is premised on the idea that any
innovation that makes products faster, cheaper, stronger, more efficient, or
otherwise more operative is one that everyone should be able to practice
unless its developer has patented it or is able to keep it as a trade secret.
Patent terms are shorter than copyright so that the technical improvements
can get into the public domain more quickly than works of authorship will.
Competition in the general products market as to unpatented technologies
promotes social welfare. It also tends to induce further innovation because
those who imitate unpatented functional designs also tend to refine, adapt,
and improve upon the designs.136 Utility patent law allows second comers
the opportunity to obtain IP protection for their adaptations or improvements, whereas copyright law blocks adaptations through the derivative work
right.137
Maintaining separateness in the boundaries of copyright and utility patent protections is thus important to achieving the proper balance in IP laws
that encourage the creation and dissemination of works of authorship and of
inventions, while avoiding the creation of monopolies that would unduly stifle competition and retard advances in science and useful arts.138 Allowing
134 Id.
135 See, e.g., Moffat, supra note 13, at 1512 (discussing how “overlapping protection disrupts the federal [IP] system, frustrates the patent and copyright bargains, and meddles
with the incentive structures” each law establishes, as well as “imposes a host of unnecessary
costs on [IP] owners, litigants, third parties, and the public”).
136 See, e.g., Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 159–60.
137 Copyright law is more hostile than patent law to second comers who adapt or
improve upon protected intellectual creations. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012) (establishing
copyright’s exclusive right to prepare derivative works). Some have criticized this difference between patent and copyright law. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 27 (suggesting that
patent law does a better job of promoting ongoing innovation of improvements than copyright). It is not apparent, though, that conventional copyrighted works, such as LinManuel Miranda’s Hamilton musical or J.K. Rowling’s Harry Potter books, are as susceptible
to improvement as functional works, such as software. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 115, § 7.3
n.12, at 7:103.
138 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33–34 (2003); see
Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146. It is also worth noting that while Mazer has held that design
patent and copyright subject matters overlap, exclusivity in IP regimes is more common
than the Nimmer treatise seems to recognize. Innovators must often choose, for instance,
between copyright and trade secrecy protection for commercially distributed copies of
works of authorship, or between patent and trade secrecy protections for technological
innovations (although firms sometimes try to have it both ways). See, e.g., W. Nicholson
Price II, Expired Patents, Trade Secrets, and Stymied Competition, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1611
(2017).
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overlapping copyright and utility patent protections would undermine this
balance and harm the public interests these laws were intended to safeguard.
II. MORE NUANCED APPROACHES TO DISCERNING COPYRIGHT/UTILITY
PATENT BOUNDARIES
Computer programs are not the only type of intellectual creation as to
which it may be difficult to discern the proper boundaries of copyright and
utility patent subject matters and protections.139 Like computer programs,
architectural designs are protectable by copyright law despite their intrinsically functional character.140 Numerous utility patents have issued to protect
architectural innovations.141 While copyright surely protects aesthetic
designs of buildings and utility patents can issue for advances in construction
technologies and processes, the intermixture of aesthetic and functional elements of building design may likewise blur the boundary lines of copyright
and utility patent protections of architectural innovations.142
139 It is beyond the scope of this Article to address whether or to what extent copyright
and utility patent subject matters overlap as applied to computer software. The issue has
been, however, of longstanding interest to me. See Pamela Samuelson, Survey on the Patent/
Copyright Interface for Computer Programs, 17 AIPLA Q.J. 256 (1989). An extensive literature
exists about what roles copyright and patent laws do or should play in protecting computer
programs and their component parts. Among the more notable contributions are:
JONATHAN BAND & MASANOBU KATOH, INTERFACES ON TRIAL 2.0 (2011); Dennis S. Karjala,
The Relative Roles of Patent and Copyright in the Protection of Computer Programs, 17 J. MARSHALL
J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 41 (1998); Mark A. Lemley, Convergence in the Law of Software Copyright?, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 (1995); Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 977 (1993); Reichman, supra note 111; Weinreb, supra note 111. I confess to having
contributed to this literature. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case
Against Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39
EMORY L.J. 1025 (1990); Samuelson, supra note 123; Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto
Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308 (1994). I expect
to address software copyright/patent boundary issues in a subsequent article.
140 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8) (2012).
141 Kevin Collins’s work-in-progress gives examples of patents that have issued for architectural innovations. See Kevin Emerson Collins, Patent Law’s Authorship Screen, 84 U. CHI.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=29226
69; Kevin Emerson Collins, A Taxonomy of Architectural Patents [hereinafter Collins, Taxonomy] (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). The Buckminster Fuller Institute
website lists this architect’s many patents and patent applications. See Patents, BUCKMINSTER
FULLER INST., https://www.bfi.org/about-fuller/bibliography/patents (last visited Mar. 23,
2017). An example of a recent architectural patent is U.S. Patent No. 9,167,724 (filed Jan.
12, 2015), issued on October 20, 2015, to Google Inc. for alternative data center building
designs.
142 Collins notes that “the law does have to distinguish the aspects of architectural ingenuity that are supposed to be copyrightable from those that are supposed to be patentable
because the same feature of a design is not supposed to receive both copyright and patent
protection.” Collins, Taxonomy, supra note 141, at 3. To assist in this assessment, Collins
constructed a taxonomy that “can helpfully illustrate categories of architectural ingenuity
that have, historically been patented, [but he] will also suggest considerable uncertainty
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Ambiguous copyright/patent subject matter disputes are, in fact, far
from new, as one pre-Baker British case recognized in 1798. A British court
dissolved an injunction issued in a copyright case, in part because it was
unclear whether the plaintiff’s design for ladies’ fans, which had adapted the
principles of telegraphy so women could converse with each other by how
they held their fans, was the subject matter of copyrights or of utility patents.143 Among the other litigated, ambiguous subject matter disputes have
been those involving toys and puzzles.144 Rare, but not unknown, are examples of intellectual creations upon a visual inspection of which it was unclear
whether the works were sculptures or machines.145
In response to ambiguous copyright or utility patent subject matter
cases, courts and the Copyright Office have developed several strategies to
channel creators to the appropriate type or scope of IP protections. The
remainder of this Part discusses each of the approaches. Sometimes explicit
and sometimes implicit in these strategies has been the desire to avert the
kinds of policy conflicts discussed in Part I that might arise if creators were
able to successfully assert both copyright and utility patent protection for the
same creation.
One approach seeks to layer or segment IP protections so that copyright
protection extends to some aspects of an intellectual creation while patent
protection may be available for other aspects. A second approach accepts the
existence of overlapping copyright and patent protections in intellectual creations, but requires the creator to elect one form of protection or the other.
A third looks to the merger doctrine under which the inseparability of aesthetic and functional elements will cause the work to be excluded from copyright protection. Under a fourth approach, the Copyright Office may decide
that certain subject matters, such as genetically engineered DNA, are not
copyright subject matter, in part because they are patent subject matter. A
fifth is a TrafFix-like approach that regards the functionality of a design
described in one or more utility patents as relevant to whether copyright protection is or should be available to that design. A sixth approach limits the
scope of copyright protection in an arguably utility-patentable creation so
that only exact or near-exact copying would infringe.
A.

The Layering or Segmentation Approach

Numerous cases decided after Baker have upheld copyrights in books
about or drawings of functional subject matters, while signaling that the copy[exists] about what can and cannot be patented on the margin, especially when patent law
butts up against copyright law.” Id. at 2.
143 A news report on the outcome of the case in Chancery, Lincoln’s Inn Hall, concerning Fanology, Clarke v. Cocks, appeared in the Morning Post and Gazetteer (London), July 24,
1798. A description of the principles of fanology can be found at The Fan, EIGHTEENTH
CENTURY LIT, http://eighteenthcenturylit.pbworks.com/w/page/76053578/Fans (last visited Mar. 23, 2017).
144 See infra Sections II.A, II.C, and II.F.
145 See infra Section II.B.
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right protection was available for certain aspects of that work (e.g., explanatory materials), but not other aspects (e.g., a shorthand system) that might
qualify for exclusive rights if utility-patented.146 The segmentation approach
treats copyright as providing one layer of protection, while recognizing that
patent law may provide another layer for different aspects.
To ensure that this kind of layering or segmentation will happen, Congress added a specific provision to the 1976 Act stating that “[i]n no case
does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”147 This provision codifies the principal
holdings of Baker v. Selden and its progeny.148
The Ninth Circuit recently applied the segmentation approach in
Bikram’s Yoga College of India, L.P. v. Evolation Yoga, LLC.149 Bikram
Choudhury developed a sequence of twenty-six yoga poses and two breathing
146 See, e.g., Brief English Sys. v. Owen, 48 F.2d 555, 556 (2d Cir. 1931) (holding that a
copyright in a book on a shorthand system was not infringed by a second book explaining
the same system). The Second Circuit recently cited Owen positively in Matthew Bender &
Co. v. West Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 674, 683 n.6 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Brief English Sys., 48 F.2d
at 556). The Supreme Court adopted a layering or segmentation approach in Baker when
ruling that Selden’s copyright provided protection to his explanation of the bookkeeping
system, but not to the bookkeeping system itself, which the Court regarded as a useful art
which could enjoy exclusive rights only if patented. See supra Section I.A; see also Kohus v.
Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 858 (6th Cir. 2003) (remanding copyright case for further analysis of
the functionality of a latch depicted in a drawing because of the technical nature of the
drawing, which may be “appropriate for patent treatment”); Forest River, Inc. v. Heartland
Recreational Vehicles, LLC, 753 F. Supp. 2d 753, 759 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (finding no
infringement of copyright in a technical drawing to build an RV with the same floor plan
as depicted in the drawing; plaintiff’s theory would turn copyright into a patent); Nat’l
Med. Care, Inc. v. Espiritu, 284 F. Supp. 2d 424, 435 (S.D. W. Va. 2003) (holding that a
technical drawing copyright was not infringed by building a cabinet for a dialysis center
because the cabinet was a utilitarian work); Fulmer v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 1021,
1022 (Ct. Cl. 1952) (concluding that the copyright in the drawing did not extend to parachute design); Muller v. Triborough Bridge Auth., 43 F. Supp. 298, 299–300 (S.D.N.Y.
1942) (holding that a copyrighted drawing was not infringed by building the bridge
approach depicted in the drawing). Some software copyright cases have endorsed a segmentation approach under which copyright protection would be available to program
code and patent protection for program processes. See, e.g., Atari Games Corp. v.
Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 839 (Fed. Cir. 1992). This approach is an example of
the filtering type of functionality screen described in Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 4, at
3.
147 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012). For a thorough discussion about the origins of this provision and its intended scope, see Samuelson, supra note 39, at 1928–36 (explaining that
Baker is not a case about the idea/expression distinction, but rather mainly a case that
establishes a channeling doctrine through which courts can avert conflicts between utility
patent and copyright subject matters, protections, and policies).
148 See Samuelson, supra note 39, 1944–52.
149 Bikram’s Yoga Coll. of India, L.P. v. Evolation Yoga, LLC, 803 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir.
2015).
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exercises. He wrote about this sequence in books, made recordings to
explain and illustrate the sequence, and directly taught the sequence to students. Choudhury sued Evolation Yoga for copyright infringement because
Evolation taught the same yoga sequence and breathing exercises.
Choudhury claimed to have registered copyrights not only in his books and
cassettes, but also in the compilation of exercises set forth in the books.150
The Ninth Circuit did not question the validity of Choudhury’s copyrights, but held that the yoga sequence was not within the scope of protection available from copyright law.151 Using Choudhury’s own words, the
Ninth Circuit explained why: “[T]he Sequence is a ‘system’ or a ‘method’
designed to ‘systematically work every part of the body, to give all internal
organs, all the veins, all the ligaments, and all the muscles everything they
need to maintain optimum health and maximum function.’”152 This system
or method was excluded from copyright protection under Baker and 17
U.S.C. § 102(b).153 To get an exclusive right in that system or method, said
the Ninth Circuit, Choudhury would have needed to get a patent.154
This segmentation or layering approach may also be useful in cases
involving toys and games, categories of intellectual creations that are sometimes copyrighted and sometimes utility-patented,155 and sometimes both.156
150 Id. at 1035–36.
151 Id. at 1038.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 1039.
154 Id. at 1039–40. The court noted that “if [the Sequence] is entitled to protection at
all, that protection is more properly sought through the patent process.” Id. at 1040. The
court declined to “opine on whether the Sequence is, in fact, patentable.” Id. n.8. The
court also rejected Choudhury’s claim that the Sequence was a protectable compilation.
Id. at 1041–42. The U.S. Copyright Office has issued a policy statement that clarifies that
compilations of exercises are not copyright-protectable subject matter. See Registration of
Claims to Copyright, 77 Fed. Reg. 37,605, 37,607 (June 22, 2012) (to be codified at 37
C.F.R. pt. 201); see also Pamela Samuelson, Functional Compilations, 54 HOUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (giving examples of compilations that were deemed too functional to be
copyright-protectable).
155 See, e.g., Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980) (upholding claims of copyright in some toys, but finding other toys insufficiently original or too
functional to be copyright-protectable); Seip v. Commonwealth Plastics, Inc., 85 F. Supp.
741 (D. Mass. 1949) (rejecting claim of copyright infringement as to a drawing of a toy
whistle that the defendant had patented). The Ninth Circuit has opined in dicta that copyright protection is unavailable to games because they are proper subject matter for patent
protection. See Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 611 F.2d 296, 300 n.1 (9th Cir.
1979) (reversing a lower ruling that “monopoly” had become a generic name for a particular game and remanding for further proceedings); see also Boyden, supra note 5, at 439
(characterizing games as straddling the boundaries of copyright and patent protections).
Class D21 of the USPTO classification of patentable inventions is for games, toys, and
sporting goods. Class D21: Games, Toys, and Sports Goods, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspcd21/schedd21.htm (last modified
Apr. 9, 2013).
156 See, e.g., Spinmaster, Ltd. v. Overbreak LLC, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (N.D. Ill. 2005)
(holding that the likelihood of copyright and patent infringement in different aspects of a
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Toys in the shapes of animals (e.g., teddy bears), for instance, may be protectable by copyright, but not by utility patent, law. Toys with mechanical
features (e.g., windup toys) may be utility-patentable, but not copyrightable.
Toys can, of course, have some mechanical elements and some expressive
elements. Insofar as this is so, the segmentation approach would assign to
patent law the role of protecting (if at all) a toy’s mechanical components
and to copyright law the role of protecting the toy’s expressive elements.157
Copyright and utility patent boundary issues may also arise as to drawings or other copyrightable materials included in patent applications and
issued patents. The U.S. Copyright Office and the USPTO policies use a segmentation approach to deal with claims of copyright in original drawings,
photographs, texts, and other copyrightable materials appearing in issued
patents.158 The Copyright Office will register claims in such materials. However, it makes clear that “the copyright in a patent[ ] [or] a patent application . . . does not extend to any ‘idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery’ that may be disclosed in these
works.”159 The USPTO allows inventors to include copyright notices in
issued patents. However, the USPTO insists that patentees who claim such
copyrights must allow some copying of those protected materials through the
notice below:
A portion of the disclosure of this patent document contains material
which is subject to [copyright] protection. The [copyright] owner has no
objection to the facsimile reproduction by anyone of the patent document
or the patent disclosure, as it appears in the Patent and Trademark Office
patent file or records, but otherwise reserves all [copyright] rights
whatsoever.160
flying saucer toy justified grant of preliminary injunction issued to prohibit manufacture
and sale of the competing product); Milligan v. Worldwide Tupperware, Inc., 972 F. Supp.
158 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (rejecting patent and copyright infringement claims in a game and a
book because patent had expired and the plaintiff failed to show substantial similarity in
expression).
157 Durham, 630 F.2d at 914–15.
158 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES
§ 717.3 (3d ed. 2014) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM]; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 608.01(w) (2015). Courts outside the United
States have sometimes denied copyright claims in drawings embodied in issued patents.
See, e.g., Catnic Components Ltd. v. Hill & Smith Ltd., [1978] F.S.R. 405 (Ch.) (Eng.)
(denying claim of copyright infringement in a drawing the defendant published in its brochure that was identical to that published in the plaintiff’s patent); see also DERCLAYE &
LEISTNER, supra note 13, at 293 (noting that courts in France and the UK have denied
copyright claims in the published texts of patents or in patent drawings).
159 COMPENDIUM, supra note 158, § 717.3 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012)).
160 37 C.F.R. § 1.71(e) (1988). A recent study notes that the number of copyright
claims mentioned in issued patents has risen in recent decades, although the percentage of
such claims in patents is still very small (under one percent). See, e.g., Dennis Crouch,
Copyrighting Your Patent?, PATENTLY-O (May 20, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/
05/copyrighting-your-patent.html. There is, however, no longer a need to put copyright
notices in patents because copyright notices became optional for works created on or after
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Since the USPTO’s adoption of this rule, there does not appear to have
been litigation in which a patentee has alleged copyright infringement arising from copying of copyrighted materials disclosed in a patent.161
B.

Requiring an Election of Protection

The Second Circuit endorsed an election of protection approach when
faced with a plaintiff who claimed copyright in a creation for which he had
sought and obtained a utility patent in Korzybski v. Underwood & Underwood,
Inc.162 Korzybski claimed copyright in a model and drawing of what he
called an anthropometer said to illustrate an Einsteinian theory.163 The
model was a structure consisting of numerous pieces of wood of various geometric shapes, having numerous holes, pegs, and strings that one could move
around. Some pieces were permanently mounted on a flat board backMarch 1, 1989. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 3: COPYRIGHT NOTICE (2013), https:/
/www.copyright.gov/circs/circ03.pdf.
161 But see Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 852 (6th Cir. 2003), in which the author of a
drawing of a latch design for a children’s play-yard sued a patentee for copyright infringement, alleging that the defendant had copied the plaintiff’s drawing in its application for a
patent on the latch. The court found error in the trial court’s infringement analysis and
remanded the case for further proceedings. Id. at 857–58; see also Univ. of Colo. Found.,
Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 974 F. Supp. 1339, 1356–57 (D. Colo. 1997) (finding that ACC
infringed copyright by copying figures and a table from the plaintiffs’ article in the patent
application for a vitamin product, although declining to award damages for this infringement, perhaps because the court awarded substantial damages for fraud and unjust enrichment arising from the defendant’s having obtained a patent based on UCF researchers’
work). Fair use resolved two other cases in which publishers sued patent lawyers for submitting to the USPTO copies of articles claimed as prior art relevant to pending patent
applications. See Am. Inst. of Physics v. Winstead PC, No. 3:12-CV-1230, 2013 WL 6242843
(N.D. Tex. Dec. 3, 2013); Am. Inst. of Physics v. Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A.,
No. 12-528, 2013 WL 4666330 (D. Minn. Aug. 30, 2013).
162 Korzybski v. Underwood & Underwood, Inc., 36 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1929). The
Korzybski opinion was written by Judge Augustus Hand whose cousin Learned served on the
same panel. As noted earlier, supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text, the Supreme
Court in Mazer declined to address whether creators must elect between copyright and
design patent protection, although all courts to have considered the issue before Mazer
had endorsed the election theory or required election. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217
(1954). The post-Mazer decision that rejected the election of protection theory in respect
of copyright and design patents was In re Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (allowing
concurrent copyright and design protection in a watch design). It is an interesting question whether election is a viable theory as between copyrights and utility patents. Baker v.
Selden suggests that useful arts, by their very nature, are patent, not copyright, subject matter. 101 U.S. 99 (1879). Developers of creative technologies, under this conception,
would seem to have no choice as between copyright and utility patent protections. Without a patent, they are seemingly ineligible for a grant of exclusive rights in their creations.
However, some creations have an ambiguous character. Just by looking at Korzybski’s
anthropometer, it is not possible to tell whether it is a sculpture or a machine. However,
the fact that Korzybski sought and obtained a utility patent on it made clear how he conceived of its subject matter.
163 Korzybski, 36 F.2d at 728.
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ground, while others hung suspended by connecting cords and plugs.164
Korzybski sued Underwood for copyright infringement because it took a photograph of his anthropometer.165
FIGURE 1

166

Underwood asserted that the model was too functional to be copyrighted because it “discloses nothing in itself and only may be employed to
work out ideas in the mind of the user.”167 The Second Circuit disagreed,
regarding the model as copyrightable because “the prime purpose of the
164 Id. The court quoted at length from Korzybski’s description of the model. The
description of the structure sounds goofy, but Alfred Korzybski was an accomplished engineer. See Alfred Korzybski (1879–1950), THE INST. OF GEN. SEMANTICS, http://www.generalsemantics.org/the-general-semantics-learning-center/alfred-korzybski/ (last visited Mar. . 23,
2017).
165 Korzybski, 36 F.2d at 729. Korzybski’s motivation to register a claim of copyright in
his anthropometer as a “plastic work[ ] of a scientific or technical character,” 17 U.S.C.
§ 5(i) (1976) (repealed), was likely because he realized he could not win a patent infringement lawsuit against Underwood based on its taking a photograph of his patented device.
Such a photograph would not constitute a making, using, or selling of the invention within
the meaning of patent law’s exclusive rights. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). More plausible
would be a claim that Underwood’s photograph infringed copyright in Korzybski’s model.
See, e.g., Gaylord v. United States, 595 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that a photograph of the copyrighted sculpture infringed). Underwood & Underwood were wellknown commercial photographers in this period. An archive of 160,000 of their photographs can be found on the Internet. UNDERWOOD PHOTO ARCHIVES, http://www
.underwoodarchives.com/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2017).
166 Left: a diagram from Korzybski’s issued patent; right: a model of the anthropometer.
This photograph appears in BRUCE I. KODISH, KORZYBSKI: A BIOGRAPHY (free online ed.
2014), http://korzybskifiles.blogspot.co.uk/2014/11/chapter-30-saint-elizabeths-part-6
.html.
167 Korzybski, 36 F.2d at 728.
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model is explanation to students of a certain system of abstract reasoning.”168
The court likened the model to “a table of logarithms, or the text of a book
in the language of a savage tribe, known only to the author.”169 If these
could be copyrighted, so could Korzybski’s model.
What sunk Korzybski’s copyright claim, in the Second Circuit’s view, was
that Korzybski had some years before sought and obtained a utility patent for
a device that was essentially the same as the model in which he claimed copyright.170 By filing for and getting this patent, Korzybski had “made a full
disclosure of his invention and dedicated it to the public, save for the right to
make, use, and vend it during the period for which the patent gave him that
monopoly.”171 There was, the court noted, “no substantial distinction”
between the device Korzybski had patented and the model in which he
claimed copyright.172 The Second Circuit went on to say that “[a]n inventor
who has applied for and obtained a patent cannot extend his monopoly by
taking out a copyright.”173 For this reason, the court decided that Under168 Id. Insofar as Korzybski’s model was an embodiment of his system of abstract reasoning, the Second Circuit could have rejected the copyright claim because the design was
a “necessary incident[ ]” of that system in keeping with the Supreme Court’s Baker decision. See Baker, 101 U.S. at 103 (“[W]here the [useful] art [a work] teaches cannot be used
without employing the methods and diagrams used to illustrate the book, or such as are
similar to them, such methods and diagrams are to be considered as necessary incidents to
the art, and given therewith to the public . . . .”). The merger doctrine has evolved to serve
as the modern rule through which to limit copyright in “necessary incidents” to useful arts.
See Pamela Samuelson, Reconceptualizing Copyright’s Merger Doctrine, 63 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y
USA 417 (2016).
169 Korzybski, 36 F.2d at 728. This would seem to be an example of the threshold type of
functionality screen described in Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 4, at 3.
170 Korzybski, 36 F.2d at 728–29. Korzybski’s utility patent for an educational appliance
was U.S. Patent No. 1,539,194A (filed July 6, 1923) (issued May 26, 1925).
171 Korzybski, 36 F.2d at 729. The Second Circuit’s assertion in Korzybski that the issuance of the patent precluded copyright protection for any expressive material in the patent
should be compared with the current Copyright Office and USPTO policies discussed
supra notes 158–60 and accompanying text. A way to reconcile the Korzybski ruling and
current agency policies would be to say that Korzybski would be entitled to enforce copyright in his drawings, but not to control manufacture of the patented anthropometer. Similar issues have arisen in the UK and Canada. See Catnic Components Ltd. v. Hill & Smith
Ltd., [1978] F.S.R. 405, 427 (Ch.) (Eng.) (holding that the patentee could not enforce
copyright in drawings published in an issued patent); see also Rucker Co. v. Gavel’s Vulcanizing Ltd., [1985]F.C.J. 1031 (Can.) (following Catnic in denying copyright claim as to
drawing from an expired patent).
172 Korzybski, 36 F.2d at 729.
173 Id. Had the Korzybski case arisen under the 1976 Act, the outcome would very likely
have been the same, although the reasoning would have been different, because it would
not infringe copyright to take a photograph of a patented machine. See 17 U.S.C. § 113(b)
(2012). Professor Crouch and I agree that this aspect of Korzybski’s ruling is probably still
good law. See Crouch, supra note 160. Several treatises also regard Korzybski as good law.
See, e.g., LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS, AND MONOPOLIES § 4:62 n.6 (4th ed. 2016); 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 23.06[2] (2016); 1 JOHN J. HAZARD JR., COPYRIGHT LAW IN BUSINESS & PRACTICE § 2:67
(2016). As noted earlier, the Nimmer treatise questions the viability of Korzybski as a prece-
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wood had not infringed copyright by photographing an embodiment of
Korzybski’s patented device.174 Having chosen to obtain utility patent protection for his device, Korzybski was foreclosed from claiming copyright in
the same design.
C.

Inseparability or Merger of Expression and Utility

The merger doctrine, which the Copyright Office and the courts can
invoke when expression and utility in an intellectual creation are inseparable, is another approach that courts have used to deal with copyright claims
in utility-patented subject matters.175 This was the basis on which the Copyright Office denied OddzOn Products’s application to register its claim of
copyright in the design of its utility-patented KOOSH balls, which it characterized as soft sculptures.176 OddzOn’s motivation to register its copyright
claim was apparently to enable it to get the U.S. Customs Service to stop
importation of inexpensive knockoffs of its popular product at the border.
The court noted that the procedure for stopping importation of copyrightinfringing products was less onerous than for stopping imports of patentinfringing products.177
The Copyright Office refused OddzOn’s application for registration on
the ground that the visual aspects of KOOSH balls, which consisted of
numerous colorful flexible filaments radiating from a center core in the
shape of a sphere, lacked original authorship.178

dent. See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text. While the Second Circuit’s reasoning
about the patent as a publication that bars copyright may no longer be sound law given
that copyright notices are no longer required for works created since 1989, the court’s
rejection of Korzybski’s copyright claim is sound and consistent with Baker.
174 Korzybski, 36 F.2d at 729.
175 Dan Burk contends that copyright’s (in)separability doctrine, which results in some
attractive pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works being deemed uncopyrightable, is a species of the more general merger doctrine under which certain works or some aspects of
protected works are deemed unprotectable by copyright law. See Dan L. Burk, Method and
Madness in Copyright Law, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 587, 591. I concur. See Samuelson, supra note
168; see also Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145 (2d Cir.
1987) (“[I]f design elements reflect a merger of aesthetic and functional considerations,
the artistic aspects of a work cannot be said to be conceptually separable from the utilitarian elements.”).
176 OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Oman, 924 F.2d 346, 347 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (describing the
KOOSH ball as “a patented, trademarked product”). The OddzOn patent was U.S. Patent
No. 4,756,529 (filed June 11, 1987) (issued July 12, 1988) [hereinafter OddzOn Patent].
177 OddzOn, 924 F.2d at 347–48. The Customs Service requires copyright claimants to
produce registration certificates before it will stop importation of copyright-infringing
products at the U.S. borders. Id. (citing 19 C.F.R. § 133.31 (1975)).
178 Id. This is an example of the threshold type of functionality screen described in
Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 4, at 3.
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FIGURE 2

179

OddzOn claimed that the feel of the KOOSH ball was expressive. However, the examiner characterized the feel of the ball as a functional part of
the product.180 The ball was, the examiner ruled, a “useful article” whose
“feel is inseparable from its utilitarian function.”181
OddzOn appealed the Office’s denial of registration. Both the district
court and the court of appeals decided that the Office had not abused its
discretion in so doing.182 The appellate court mentioned in passing the existence of a utility patent on the KOOSH ball design,183 although its analysis of
the registrability issue was seemingly not influenced by the existence of this
patent. Yet, by affirming the Office’s refusal to register OddzOn’s copyright
claim, the court thwarted OddzOn’s effort to avoid going through with the
179 KOOSH ball (photograph by NightMist, distributed under a CC BY-SA 3.0 license).
180 OddzOn, 924 F.2d at 347–48. OddzOn’s patent claimed the soft feel of the ball as
functional because it made the ball easy to catch. See OddzOn Patent, supra note 176, at 1
(describing patent as being for a “generally spherical object with floppy filaments to promote sure capture”).
181 OddzOn, 924 F.2d at 349. During the pendency of its application for registration,
OddzOn did not challenge the Office’s characterization of the KOOSH ball as a “useful
article.” It did so, however, on appeal, relying on Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L Corp., 703 F.2d
970 (6th Cir. 1983), in which the Sixth Circuit ruled that a toy airplane was not a “useful
article” and hence not subject to separability analysis. The D.C. Circuit rejected this argument because OddzOn had not raised the issue earlier. OddzOn, 946 F.2d at 350.
182 OddzOn, 946 F.2d at 348–50. Yet the decision indicated that it was not ruling that
the KOOSH ball was uncopyrightable, but only that the Office had not abused its discretion in denying registration. Id. at 350. The author of the D.C. Circuit’s opinion was thenJudge, now-Justice, Ruth Bader Ginsburg. This suggests that Justice Ginsburg would not be
a proponent of categorical exclusivity of copyright and utility patent protections.
183 Id. at 347.
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more rigorous process for getting U.S. Customs officials to stop patentinfringing KOOSH knockoffs at the border.
Louis Kohus, like OddzOn, claimed both copyright and utility patent
protection in the same creation.184 He obtained a utility patent in April of
1989 for a “baby swing support assembly.”185 In 2009, three years after that
patent expired, Kohus sought to register his claim of copyright in the swing
design as a three-dimensional sculpture.186 The Office refused registration
on the ground that there was no physically or conceptually separable sculptural authorship to support a copyright in the swing design.187

184 In another unrelated case, Kohus sued two of his former business partners (one of
whom was his co-inventor on the children’s swing patent discussed in this Section) for
copyright infringement, alleging that the defendants had copied his drawing of a latch
design for a portable children’s playground in their application for a utility patent on the
latch design. See Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848 (6th Cir. 2003). The court observed that
“Kohus invents and designs consumer products, including children’s items.” Id. at 851.
From the court’s description of the dispute, it appears that Kohus regarded the latch
design as within the scope of copyright in the drawing. Id. at 851–53. The Sixth Circuit
did not directly address that issue, although it decided that the trial court had used the
wrong test for infringement. It remanded the case for further proceedings in which the
trial court was supposed to take into account the functionality of the latch design and
consider whether the merger or scènes à faire doctrines narrowed the scope of the Kohus
copyright. Id. at 853–57. The appellate court directed the trial court to allow expert testimony about the latch design, noting that “the drawings are technical and are appropriate
for patent treatment.” Id. at 858. The court thought that trained engineering experts
could offer “interpretational guidance” about “the structure and function of the device
that the drawings depict.” Id. The design of a latch for a children’s playground is, however, a useful article that would almost certainly fail a separability test. Under 17 U.S.C.
§ 113(b) (2012), the court should have ruled that the copyright in the Kohus drawing did
not extend to the latch design and affirmed the lower court’s ruling in favor of Mariol.
185 U.S. Patent No. 4,822,033 (filed Nov. 3, 1987) (issued Apr. 18, 1989). Kohus was
one of three inventors on this utility patent. The patent contained numerous drawings of
the swing from different angles. These drawings are substantially similar to the drawings of
the swing in which Kohus also claimed copyright. See Second Amended Complaint for
Copyright Infringement & Promissory Estoppel with Jury Demand at 8, Kohus v. Graco
Children’s Prods. Inc., 13 F. Supp. 3d 829 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (No. 1:09-cv-503); see also
Kohus, 13 F. Supp. 3d at 832 (“The patent drawings show essentially the same swing as the
Y-frame swing shown in the renderings sent to [Graco].”).
186 Letter from Steve Ruwe, Attorney-Advisor for the Review Bd. of the U.S. Copyright
Office to William H. Oldach III, at 1 (June 21, 2013) [hereinafter Ruwe Letter] (on file
with the author).
187 Id.
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FIGURE 3

188

Asserting that the small-scale, three-dimensional version in which he
claimed copyright was a toy, not a useful article, Kohus asked the Office to
reconsider its initial rejection of his application for registration.189 The
Office has sometimes accepted registrations for toys, even those with some
functional dimensions.190 Based on this characterization of the work at issue,
the Office granted him a registration certificate.191
Several years later, the Office became aware that Kohus was now claiming infringement of that copyright against Graco, a firm that was making and
selling larger-scale instantiations of the swing in which children might sit.192
In reaction to this development, the Office proposed to cancel Kohus’s regis188 Left: drawing of Kohus’s patented baby swing support assembly; right: Graco baby
swing.
189 Ruwe Letter, supra note 186, at 2–3.
190 Like OddzOn, Kohus relied upon Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L Corp., 703 F.2d 970 (6th
Cir. 1983) (holding that a toy airplane was not a useful article), as well as on other similar
cases. Ruwe Letter, supra note 186, at 2–6.
191 Ruwe Letter, supra note 186, at 23.
192 In 2009, following failed negotiations, Kohus sued Graco Children’s Products, contending that Graco’s swings infringed his copyright. Graco filed a motion to dismiss the
claim on the ground that the swing was a useful article that lacked separable expressive
elements. A federal court denied this motion and allowed Kohus to file a supplement to
his amended complaint. See Kohus v. Graco Children’s Prods., Inc., 2010 WL 3785311
(S.D. Ohio 2010). The court characterized Kohus as “an inventor,” id. at 1, and yet
rejected Graco’s claim that the swing was an unprotectable useful article id. at 2–4. That
decision did not mention the expired patent.
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tration because the full-sized swing was a useful article that lacked separable
expressive elements.193
Unwilling to accede to this cancellation, Kohus once again asked the
Office to reconsider. He urged the Copyright Office Review Board to grant
him a registration certificate under its “rule of doubt” so that a federal court
could rule on whether the swing was a useful article which had separable
artistic elements.194
Although the Review Board expressed serious doubts about Kohus’s
claim, it eventually granted this request.195 Following this decision, Kohus
filed a second amended complaint against Graco, alleging that it copied his
swing’s open top and curved legs, two key features claimed in the utility patent.196 Graco then moved for summary judgment, which the trial court
denied. Although the case eventually settled, Kohus got farther with that
litigation than he should have. The Copyright Office should have cancelled
the Kohus copyright registration and denied the “rule of doubt” registration,
both because the Office was correct that the artistic and functional aspects of
the swing were inseparable (i.e., merged) and because the swing design was
the subject matter of an expired patent.
Kohus notwithstanding, courts have generally been quite careful about
interpreting copyright law so that it does not provide exclusive rights in
designs of useful articles that are more appropriate subject matters for the
utility patent regime.197

193 Ruwe Letter, supra note 186, at 3–7. Graco must have asked the Office to cancel
Kohus’s registration after losing its motion to dismiss.
194 Id. at 8. On rare occasions, the Office issues registration certificates, even when it
doubts a work is copyrightable, so that claimants are able to litigate the copyrightability
issue in federal court.
195 Id. at 9.
196 Second Amended Complaint for Copyright Infringement & Promissory Estoppel
with Jury Demand at 8, Kohus v. Graco Children’s Prods. Inc., 13 F. Supp. 3d 829 (S.D.
Ohio 2014) (No. 1:09-cv-503). Graco filed two summary judgment motions, one based on
a prior settlement agreement and one on the useful article doctrine (relying on the Copyright Office’s earlier denial). The district court denied Graco’s motion based on the prior
settlement agreement. Kohus, 13 F. Supp. 3d 829. The parties subsequently settled.
197 See, e.g., Modern Aids, Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 264 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1959) (holding
that without a utility patent, the owner of copyright in a drawing of a massage machine
could not get exclusive rights to control the sale of the same or similar machines); Forest
River, Inc. v. Heartland Recreational Vehicles, LLC, 753 F. Supp. 2d 753, 759 (N.D. Ind.
2010) (concluding that copyright in a drawing of the floor plan of a recreational vehicle
was not infringed by an advertisement for a competing product; “[t]o hold otherwise
would be to elevate the Plaintiff’s copyright to a patent”); Smith & Hawken, Ltd. v.
Gardendance, Inc., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d 1853, 1855 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (“The useful article doctrine serves the important policy of keeping patent and copyright separate by preventing
parties from using copyright to obtain a ‘backdoor patent’ on a functional article that
cannot be patented.”); see also cases cited supra note 68.
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Some Intellectual Creations Are Not Works of Authorship in Part
Because of Their Patentability

Some enterprising creators have sought to register claims of copyright in
subject matters that the Copyright Office deems uncopyrightable in part
because they might be utility-patentable.198 An example is the Office’s
denial of a biotechnologist’s application to register this Prancer DNA
Sequence199:
ATGGCAAGCTTGGTTAAGAAAGATATGTGTATTAAGATGACGATGGAG
GGTACTGTGAACGGTCACCATTTCAAATGCGTCGGTGAGGGTGAAGGC
AAACCGTTCGAAGGTACCCAGAACATGCGTATCCGCGTAACCGAAGGT
GCGCCGCTGCCGTTTGCGTTCGACATCCTGAGCCCGTGCTGCGCGTAC
GGCAGCAAGACGTTCATTAAGCACGTATCGGGCATTCCTGATTACTTC
AAAGAAAGCTTTCCGGAGGGCTTTACGTGGGAGCGTACCACCATTTAT
GAGGACGGTGGTGTTCTGACCGCGCACCAAGATACCTCCCTGGAAGGC
AATTGTCTGATCTACAAAGTTAAGGTTCTGGGCACTAATTTCCCGGCG
GATGGCCCAGTATGAAGAAAATCTCCGGTGGTTGGGAGCCGTGCGTGG
AGATGCTGTACCCGCGTCATGGTGTCCTGTGTGGTCAGAGCCTGATGG
CCCTGAAATGTACCGACGGTAACCACCTGACCAGCCATCTGCGTACTA
CCTACCGCAGCCGTAAGCCGAGCAACGCCGTCAACATGCCGGAGTTTC
ACTTCGGCGACCATCGCATCGAAATTCTGAAAGCTGAGCAAGGTAAAT
198 The University of New Hampshire’s IPMall website provides access to U.S. Copyright Office Board of Appeals Decisions from 1995–2014. See U.S. Copyright Office Board of
Appeals Decisions: Decision of the Appeals Board-U.S. Copyright Office 1995-2014, U.N.H. SCH. OF
L. IPMALL, http://ipmall.law.unh.edu/content/us-copyright-office-board-appeals-decisions
(last visited Mar. 23, 2017). Among many types of creations for which the Office has
denied copyright registration for failure to claim copyrightable subject matter are crash
test dummies, LandRover vehicle designs, caskets, and handbags. See Letter from William
J. Roberts, Jr., Copyright Office Review Bd., to Daniel Bliss (Sept. 11, 2014), https://ipmall
.law.unh.edu/sites/default/files/hosted_resources/CopyrightAppeals/2014/Q1Q10,Q1
.52014.pdf (crash test dummy); Letter from William J. Roberts, Jr., Copyright Office
Review Bd., to Michael B. Stewart (Aug. 19, 2014), https://ipmall.law.unh.edu/sites/
default/files/hosted_resources/CopyrightAppeals/2014/L405LandRoverVehicleDesign
2014.pdf (LandRover vehicle design); Letter from Tanya Sandros, Deputy Gen. Counsel,
Copyright Office Review Bd., to Brett A. Schatz (Dec. 11, 2012), https://ipmall.law.unh
.edu/sites/default/files/hosted_resources/CopyrightAppeals/2012/BrettSchatz.pdf (casket); Letter from Tanya M. Sandros, Deputy Gen. Counsel, Copyright Office Review Bd., to
Jess M. Collen (Feb. 22, 2013), http://ipmall.law.unh.edu/sites/default/files/hosted_
resources/CopyrightAppeals/2013/ClassicBag115748and1other.pdf (handbag).
199 See Letter from Robert J. Kasunic, Associate Register of Copyrights, Copyright Office
Review Bd., to Mr. Simon (Feb. 11, 2014) (explaining the Office’s reasons for denying
reconsideration of its refusal to register Simon’s claim in the genetically engineered
Prancer DNA sequence in part because it was patentable subject matter) (on file with the
author); see also Letter from William J. Roberts, Jr., Copyright Office Review Bd., to Tamsen
Barrett (Sept. 5, 2013), http://ipmall.law.unh.edu/sites/default/files/hosted_resources/
CopyrightAppeals/2013/GloFishRedZebraDanioGlowing.pdf (explaining why the Copyright Office had denied registration to a “GloFish Red Zebra Danio Glowing in Artificial
Sunlight” on the ground that this genetically engineered fish was not copyrightable subject
matter). This is another example of the exclusion type of functionality screen described in
Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 4, at 3.
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TCTATGAACAATATGAGAGCGCGGTGGCACGTTATTGCGAAGCGGCTC
CGTCTAAGCTGGGTCATCACTAA.

Proponents of DNA copyrights claim that sequences, such as Prancer,
are protectable as literary works.200 The statutory definition of this term—
“works . . . expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the material objects . . . in which
they are embodied”—is arguably capacious enough to encompass DNA creations.201 DNA sequences, like computer programs, are sets of instructions
that bring about certain results.202 Of course, DNA sequences found in
nature could not be copyrighted for lack of human authorship, but genetic
engineers should, proponents believe, be accepted as authors who express
themselves in genetic code.
After the Office rejected the application to register the Prancer
sequence, the applicant appealed. The Office denied the appeal on three
principal grounds: first, the sequence was not an original work of authorship
within the meaning of the 1976 Act; second, the sequence was among the
procedures, processes, systems, and methods of operation that § 102(b)
excludes from copyright protection; and third, the Office could not discern a
sufficient quantum of copyrightable authorship to support a claim of
copyright.203
The Prancer sequence may well be a human creation, but the Office
noted that “the operation of the DNA is dictated by the laws of biology.”204
The Office could not discern any human authorship in the sequence to
which copyright protection might attach. Nor did the Prancer sequence fall
within any of the existing statutorily recognized categories of authorship.
The Office felt constrained by the 1976 Act and its legislative history not to
expand the bounds of copyright subject matter, saying that such expansions
were a congressional prerogative.205
Among the reasons given for rejecting this application was that “a claim
in a DNA sequence may be far better suited for the realm of patent” than for
copyright,206 in keeping with the Supreme Court’s decision in Association for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.207 Myriad “provides reason to question whether synthetic or cDNA sequences are proper subject matter for copyright since they are eligible for patent protection.”208 The patentability of
200 See, e.g., Andrew W. Torrance, DNA Copyright, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 30, 39–40 (2011);
see also Letter from Robert Kasunic to Mr. Simon, supra note 199, at 4 (noting the claimant’s pro-copyright argument analogizing DNA sequences to computer programs).
201 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “literary works”).
202 Torrance, supra note 200, at 31–34.
203 Letter from Robert Kasunic to Mr. Simon, supra note 199, at 1.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 2–3.
206 Id. at 1.
207 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013)
(upholding the patentability of cDNA sequences, but rejecting the patentability of isolated
natural sequences).
208 Letter from Robert Kasunic to Mr. Simon, supra note 199, at 5.
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DNA sequences thus strengthened the Office’s conclusion that they were not
copyright subject matter.209
The Office also characterized the Prancer sequence as a “genetic
formula for a biological system” lacking in “copyrightable expression.”210
The choices of how to arrange the nucleotide sequences in Prancer, even if
the result of some human creativity, were “not made for the purpose of artistic expression” and did not bear the imprint of copyrightable authorship.211
The arrangement was rather “linked together in a specific order to be used
to produce a functional result in a biological organism.”212 This made the
sequence an unprotectable process or system.
While the eligibility of a DNA sequence such as Prancer for utility patent
protection was not the sole rationale for rejecting its creator’s claim of copyright, the patentability of such sequences and concerns about social harms
from overlapping protections were factors in the Office’s decision not to
accept registration of DNA copyright claims.
E.

Relevance of Utility Patents to the Viability of Copyright Claims

Another strategy for managing copyright/utility patent boundaries may
be to consider the existence of issued utility patents as strong evidence that
an intellectual creation at issue should be understood to be utility patent, not
copyright, subject matter.213 A similar approach was taken relatively recently,
albeit in the context of a trade dress/utility patent dispute, in the Supreme
Court’s decision in TrafFix.214 The Court recognized that the functionality
claimed in an issued utility patent should be taken into account when assessing later claims that the design was protectable trade dress.215 Commentators have suggested a TrafFix-like approach should be used when assessing
the significance of utility patents for copyright claims.216
209 Id.
210 Id. at 6.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 7.
213 See, e.g., Brown Instrument Co. v. Warner, 161 F.2d 910, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1947); Taylor
Instrument Cos. v. Fawley-Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98, 100–101 (7th Cir. 1943); see also Laureyssens v. Idea Grp., Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 141 (2d Cir. 1992). Laureyssens is discussed infra notes
228–39 and accompanying text. This would seem to be an example of the threshold type
of functionality screen described in Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 4, at 3.
214 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
215 For a discussion of the post-TrafFix trademark functionality cases, see for example
Mark P. McKenna, (Dys)functionality, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 823 (2011).
216 See, e.g., Moffat, supra note 5, at 648–56 (endorsing adaption of the TrafFix functionality test for determining when pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works are ineligible for
copyright protection because functional elements are inseparable); Samuelson, supra note
123, 46–53 (proposing a TrafFix-like approach to determining when aspects of computer
programs are too functional to be protected by copyright law). Consistent with this
approach was a district court’s consideration of utility patents on application program
interfaces (APIs) as relevant to Oracle’s copyright claim in elements of the Java API,
although the district court did not cite to TrafFix. See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 872
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Marketing Displays claimed trade dress protection in a dual spring
design for outdoor signs so that the signs would bend in strong wind and
bounce back after the wind died down.217 After TrafFix began selling signs
using this design, Marketing Displays sued it for trade dress infringement.
The trial court held that the dual spring design was too functional to be
protectable trade dress.218 The Sixth Circuit reversed on the grounds that
the same function could be achieved through alternative designs and that
adoption of one of those alternatives would not put competitors such as TrafFix at a significant nonreputational advantage.219 That court gave little
weight to the existence of the expired utility patent that Marketing Displays
had acquired some years before.220 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
to resolve a circuit split over whether product configurations could be protected as trade dress if a significant part of the configurations had been covered by a utility patent.221
The Court in TrafFix regarded the existence of a prior patent as having
“vital significance” and as “strong evidence” that a product configuration was
functional.222 It put a heavy burden on trade dress claimants to prove
nonfunctionality through evidence that the design was “merely . . . ornamental, incidental, or arbitrary.”223 Competitive necessity to copy a feature and
the existence of alternative designs were not the proper tests for judging
whether a patented design could qualify for trade dress protection.224
The Court in TrafFix held that a design was too functional to qualify as
protectable trade dress if it was essential to the use or purpose of the device
or it affected the cost or quality of the product.225 In applying this test to the
facts in TrafFix, the Court characterized the dual spring design as an “essential feature” of the claimed trade dress and noted that the design had important operational advantages.226 The dual spring design was consequentially
too functional to qualify for trade dress protection.
The approach the Court used in TrafFix could easily be adapted for use
in copyright cases. For instance, when assessing the copyrightability of models such as Korzybski’s anthropometer, a court could treat the existence of a
F. Supp. 2d 974, 996 (N.D. Cal. 2012), rev’d, 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135
S. Ct. 2887 (2015) (mem.). The Oracle decision’s treatment of the patent/copyright distinction is discussed at length in Samuelson, supra note 123, at 47–53.
217 TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 25–26.
218 See Mktg. Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 971 F. Supp. 262, 276 (E.D. Mich.
1997), rev’d, 200 F.3d 929 (6th Cir. 1999), rev’d, 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
219 Mktg. Displays, 200 F.3d at 940.
220 TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 32. Even if the dual spring design had not been patented, the
Court ruled that it would still have been too functional to qualify for trade dress protection. Id.
221 Id. at 28.
222 Id. at 29.
223 Id. at 30.
224 Id. at 32–34.
225 Id. at 33.
226 Id. at 30–31.
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utility patent on the same subject matter, any equivalence between the device
as claimed in the patent and the model said to be copyrightable, and any
descriptions of the functionality of the device described in the patent as
strong evidence that that model was too functional to be eligible for copyright protection. The court in Korzybski could obviously not have foreseen
the Court’s later ruling in TrafFix. However, if a similar case arose in the
future, courts might find it useful to adapt the analysis in TrafFix to consider
whether copyright and utility patent protection should be understood to
coexist in the same intellectual creation or whether the patent claims identify
utilitarian functionality for the design that should preclude copyright
protection.
F.

Thin Scope of Copyright If Utility Patents Cover Similar Designs

Another strategy that courts can use when trying to discern the proper
boundaries of copyright and utility patent protections as to intellectual creations that do not fit within conventional copyright or patent subject matter
domains is to interpret the scope of copyright narrowly insofar as designs of
that sort are or may be utility-patent-eligible.227 Exemplifying this approach
is Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., which considered the copyrightability of several foam rubber puzzles, each of which consisted of six flat pieces with
notches that could be assembled to form three-dimensional hollow cubes.228
FIGURE 4

229

After negotiations between IGI and an agent for Laureyssens to market
the latter’s puzzles fell through, IGI decided to make and sell similar puzzles
227 As McKenna & Sprigman have observed, patent law lacks a coherent account of the
functionality that should be regulated through the utility patent regime. See McKenna &
Sprigman, supra note 4, at 4–11.
228 Laureyssens v. Idea Grp., Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 132–33 (2d Cir. 1992).
229 Laureyssen’s Happy Cube. This photograph is available by ShooshX at WIKIMEDIA
COMMONS, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:HappyCubeParisModel.jpg.
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in competition with Laureyssens.230 This caused Laureyssens to charge IGI
with copyright and trade dress infringement. The trial court granted
Laureyssens’s motion for a preliminary injunction to stop IGI’s manufacture
and sale of the puzzles that were substantially similar to Laureyssens’s on the
trade dress claim,231 and Laureyssens appealed.
In an effort to undermine Laureyssens’s copyright claim, IGI brought to
the trial court’s attention some expired utility patents for cube puzzles that
were quite similar to Laureyssens’s and IGI’s puzzles.232 The trial court
brushed aside the patent-based challenge and decided that there was sufficient originality in Laureyssens’s puzzles to qualify for copyright protection,
and the expressiveness of his puzzles was separable from their
functionality.233
The Second Circuit accepted that IGI had copied design elements from
Laureyssens’s puzzles, but affirmed the trial court’s ruling that this copying
did not constitute improper appropriation of expression from Laureyssens’s
puzzle. IGI had, in the Second Circuit’s view, only copied “the idea of a
perfect hollow cube puzzle that can also be assembled in flat form,” which
required “a designer [to] use pieces that interlock through fingers and
notches cut at right angles.”234 The court took into account the existence of
two patents issued in the mid-1970s for flat-to-cube puzzles as having a bearing on the scope of protection available to Laureyssens’s puzzle.235 Because
IGI had designed its puzzles differently from Laureyssens’s by changing the
size of the notches and the shapes of puzzle pieces,236 the court concluded
there was no copyright infringement. The design change “result[ed] in a
qualitatively different challenge to the puzzler.”237
Another factor that impressed the court was that IGI’s puzzle had been
created with software programmed to generate complex designs for flat-tocube puzzles.238 While the court did not discuss possible policy tensions that
230 Laureyssens, 964 F.2d at 134.
231 Id. at 133. The Second Circuit affirmed the trial court’s ruling on the copyright
claim, but reversed its ruling on the trade dress claim. Id. at 133. The Second Circuit
agreed with the trial court that Laureyssens’s puzzles had not yet acquired secondary meaning, but disagreed with its ruling in favor of Laureyssens on his secondary-meaning-in-themaking theory. Id. at 137–39.
232 Laureyssens v. Idea Grp., Inc., 768 F. Supp. 1036, 1051–53 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff’d in
part, vacated in part, and remanded in part, 964 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1992). IGI seems to have
argued that these patents showed that the puzzles were utility patent, not copyright, subject
matter, and because the patents had expired, both Laureyssens and IGI had the right to
make these flat-to-cube puzzles. See id.
233 See id.
234 Laureyssens, 964 F.2d at 141.
235 Id. at 141–42. This is an example of the filtering type of functionality screen
described in Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 4, at 3.
236 The court noted that there were no pieces that were “virtually identical.” Laureyssens, 964 F.2d at 142.
237 Id.
238 Id.
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overlapping copyright and utility patent protections might engender,239 the
court elided the potential for copyright to be used to protect the subject
matter of expired patents by construing the scope of copyright in Laureyssens’s puzzle to be quite narrow.
CONCLUSION
It is useful to conceptualize the various strategies that courts, the Copyright Office, and commentators have taken to discerning the copyright/utility patent boundaries as lying along a spectrum. A Baker-inspired categorical
exclusivity approach would be at one end of this spectrum, and a Nimmerlike overlap-accepting approach would be at the opposite end. The segmentation, merger, and TrafFix-like approaches would seem to be closer to the
categorical exclusivity end of the spectrum, as would be the uncopyrightable
subject matter approach. The thin scope and election of protection
approaches, although they seemingly accept the existence of some overlap in
protectability by utility patents and copyrights, represent pragmatic judicial
responses for managing the copyright/patent boundaries in those unusual
cases in which both forms of protection might arguably be claimed.
The Supreme Court in Baker recognized the risk that creators might be
tempted to try to get both types of protection and warned against allowing
dual copyright and utility patent claims.240 Some creators, notably Korzybski,
OddzOn, and Kohus, did succumb to that temptation, but for the most part,
courts have rejected overlapping protection claims.
Korzybski’s motivation to assert copyright protection in the scientific
model he created to demonstrate an Einsteinian theory was seemingly due to
his recognition that the utility patent he had obtained in the anthropometer
device would not give him the relief he wanted against Underwood. Underwood’s photograph of Korzybski’s patented device would not infringe his utility patent, although it might have infringed a valid copyright.241 Having
239 The court was sufficiently impressed by the patents to append copies of the two
most relevant patents to its decision. See Laureyssens v. Idea Grp., Inc., 768 F. Supp. 1036,
1056–63 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
240 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879).
241 See supra note 164 (explaining that defendant Underwood’s photograph of Korzybski’s anthropometer would not have infringed his patent, although it might have infringed
copyright if his claim for that protection had been upheld). The story behind Korzybski’s
copyright claim is even stranger than I initially realized. Korzybski was upset because his
anthropometer was blamed for driving a doctor insane and for the doctor’s wife’s disappearance, perhaps as a murder victim, in newspaper stories that featured pictures of the
anthropometer, the doctor, and the missing wife. Korzybski was also interrogated by the
police because of the connection suspected between his patented device and the crazy
doctor and missing wife. Korzybski wanted to stop further publication of stories linking his
device with this couple, so he sued the photographer for infringement to stop further use
of the photograph of his device in connection with the lurid stories. See KODISH, supra
note 166, http://korzybskifiles.blogspot.com/2014/12/chapter-32-trial-by-headline-part-3
.html.
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elected to claim a utility patent on that device, the Second Circuit held him
to this choice, which foreclosed his copyright claim.
OddzOn’s motivation to register its claim of copyright protection in its
KOOSH ball was seemingly to make it easier to arrange for U.S. Customs
officials to stop importation of low-priced knockoff versions of this product.242 OddzOn’s effort to bypass the procedural requirements necessary to
block imports of patented products failed because the Copyright Office
refused to register his claim of copyright.243 This avoided the abuse of process that OddzOn was trying to achieve.
Kohus claimed copyright in his child’s swing design after his utility patent expired.244 A copyright would obviously prolong his statutory monopoly
on that useful design. During the time he was trying to register this claim
with the Copyright Office, Kohus was clever enough to claim the swing
design as a toy without mentioning the expired patent. Yet, soon after he
succeeded in registering this copyright, Kohus sued a firm for copyright
infringement for manufacturing a full-sized version in which children could
swing.245 The Copyright Office should have cancelled the registration upon
learning of this lawsuit. The Office did the public interest a disservice by
granting Kohus’s request for a registration certificate under the rule of
doubt. The trial court did a similar disservice in denying the manufacturer’s
motion for summary judgment. It is against very important and well-recognized public policies to allow copyright to be asserted to extend exclusive
rights in functional designs that are the subject of expired utility patents.
Even in the absence of an issued utility patent, however, Kohus’s design for a
child’s swing should be unprotectable by copyright law because its aesthetic
elements were merged with its functionality.
Of the eight strategies this Article has identified for managing and discerning the boundaries of copyright and utility patent law, the layering or
segmentation approach is the most typical. Under it, some aspects of an
intellectual creation (e.g., a drawing of a parachute) is understood to be eligible for copyright protection, while other aspects might be eligible for utility
patent protection (e.g., the design of the parachute depicted in the drawing). Even though a copyrighted work may embody both types of creativity, it
has generally proven relatively straightforward in the more than 130 years
since Baker to assign to copyright the role of protecting expressiveness in the
work and to patents the role of protecting novel and nonobvious technological discoveries depicted or described therein.
There have, however, been times when it was unclear whether certain
creations, such as Korzybski’s anthropometer and Laureyssens’s puzzles, are
copyright or utility patent subject matter. In such cases, the election of protection, merger, and thin scope of protection doctrines may provide courts
with useful strategies for managing copyright/utility patent boundaries.
242
243
244
245

See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 176–83 and accompanying text.
Kohus v. Graco Children’s Prods. Inc., 13 F. Supp. 3d 829, 832–33 (S.D. Ohio 2014).
See supra notes 184–95 and accompanying text.
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Although the Nimmer treatise still endorses the overlap-accepting
approach, this Article has shown the treatise’s analysis of the copyright/utility
patent overlap issue is deeply flawed, because it not only rests on significant
misrepresentations of the relevant caselaw, but also exhibits a blindness to
the many policy considerations that have caused the overwhelming majority
of courts and commentators to find ways to treat copyrights and utility patents as operating in separate domains.
Even so, this Article has acknowledged that the Supreme Court has
sometimes been reluctant to embrace categorical exclusivity approaches in IP
cases. It decided against this approach in TrafFix as to trade dress designs
that had previously been the subject of utility patent protection.246 It was
also not persuaded by Borland’s categorical exclusivity defense in Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland.247 Given this, it may seem risky to raise categorical
exclusivity defenses in cases involving copyright claims for what is seemingly
patent subject matter. Yet it is worth remembering that the Court in Mazer
endorsed both Taylor and Brown, citing them for the proposition that copyright and utility patent protections are “mutually exclusive.”248 The Court
also did not reject this defense in Borland; it just affirmed, by an equally
divided Court, the First Circuit’s decision that the command hierarchy was
an unprotectable method of operation.249 At the very least, however, the
existence of utility patents on the same or very similar intellectual creations
as that being claimed as copyright subject matter should, in keeping with the
Court’s approach in TrafFix, be considered strong evidence that the creation
is too functional to be protectable by copyright law.
In closing, it is worth noting that in the past two hundred-some years,
there has been no instance in which courts have upheld utility patent and
copyright protections in the same aspect of the same intellectual creation.250
In view of this, the copyright/utility patent overlap problem might seem to
be of only theoretical interest. This problem is, however, manifestly real and
substantial when it comes to articulating the relative roles of patent and copyright law in protecting computer software innovations.251 That, however, is a
topic for another day.

246 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
247 Before the Supreme Court, Borland’s lawyer rested much of the firm’s defense on a
categorical exclusivity theory, arguing that computer program command hierarchies and
macro systems were not protectable by copyright law because they were utility patent subject matter. See Brief for Respondent at 22–37, Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 516
U.S. 233 (1996) (per curiam) (No. 94-2003). The Court split 4-4 in Borland, 516 U.S. 233.
248 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 215 n.33 (1954).
249 Borland, 516 U.S. 233.
250 Graco may not have won its motions to dismiss or for summary judgment in the
litigation with Kohus, but there was no ruling that Graco, in fact, infringed Kohus’s copyright. Kohus v. Graco Children’s Prods. Inc., 13 F. Supp. 3d 829 (S.D. Ohio 2014).
251 See, e.g., supra note 139. Collins suggests that the copyright/utility patent boundary
issue may also be quite troublesome in respect of architectural works. See Collins, Taxonomy, supra note 141, at 2.
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